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ARTICLE

THE NEW BOND WORKOUTS

WILLIAM W. BRATTON† & ADAM J. LEVITIN‡
Bond workouts are a famously dysfunctional method of debt restructuring. The
process is so ridden with opportunistic and coercive behavior by both bondholders and
bond issuers as to make success intrinsically unlikely. Yet since 2008 bond workouts
have quietly started to work. A segment of the restructuring market has shifted from
bankruptcy court to out-of-court workouts by way of exchange offers made only to large
institutional investors. The new workouts feature a battery of strong-arm tactics by
bond issuers, and aggrieved bondholders have complained in court. There resulted a
new, broad reading of the primary law governing workouts, section 316(b) of the Trust
Indenture Act of 1939 (TIA), which prohibits majority-vote amendments of bond
payment terms and forces bond issuers seeking to restructure to resort to exchange offers.
This Article exploits the bond market’s reaction to the shift in law to reassess a
longstanding debate in corporate finance regarding the desirability of TIA section
316(b). Section 316(b) has attracted intense criticism, with calls for its amendment
or repeal because of its untoward effects on the workout process and tendency to push
restructuring into the costly bankruptcy process. Yet section 316(b) has also been

† Nicholas F. Gallicchio Professor of Law and Co-Director, Institute for Law & Economics,
University of Pennsylvania Law School.
‡ Agnew N. Williams Research Professor and Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law
Center. The article has benefitted from presentations at the Georgetown University Law Center
Faculty Workshop, the University of Pennsylvania Law School Institute for Law & Economics
Corporate Roundtable, the Goethe/Penn Conference on Law & Finance, the Villanova Business
Law Colloquium, the Columbia-Duke-NYU Black Holes Conference, and the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review Symposium. The authors wish to thank Philip Abelson, Adam Badawi,
Martin Bienenstock, Tony Casey, Jill Fisch, Jesse Fried, Whitman Holt, Henry Hu, Marcel Kahan,
David Kershaw, Frank Partnoy, Robert Rasmussen, Mark Roe, Gabriel Rauterberg, Richard Schifter,
and Eric Talley, for their comments on earlier drafts, and Joshua Kaufman, Emil Kleinhaus, and
participants in the 2016 Financial Lawyers Seminar for sharing their practice experience, and Ari
Dropkin and the Georgetown University Law Library staff for research assistance.

(1597)

1598

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 166: 1597

staunchly defended on the ground that mom-and-pop bondholders need protection
from sharp-elbowed issuer tactics.
We draw on a pair of original, hand-collected data sets to show that many of the
empirical assumptions made in the debate no longer hold true. We show that markets
have learned to live with section 316(b)’s limitations, denuding the case for repeal of
any urgency. Workouts generally succeed, so that there is no serious transaction cost
problem stemming from the TIA; when a company goes straight into bankruptcy there
tend to be independent motivations. We also show that workout by majority
amendment would not systematically disadvantage bondholders. Indeed, the recent
turn to secured creditor control of bankruptcy proceedings makes direct amendment
all the more attractive to unsecured bondholders.
Based on this empirical background, we cautiously argue for the repeal of section
316(b). Section 316(b) no longer does much work, even as it prevents bondholders
and bond issuers from realizing their preferences regarding modes of restructuring and
voting rules. We do not know what contracting equilibrium would obtain following
repeal, but think that the matter is best left to the market. Still, we recognize that
markets are imperfect and that a free-contracting regime may result in abuses.
Accordingly, we argue that repeal of section 316(b) should be accompanied by the
resuscitation of the long-forgotten doctrine of intercreditor good faith duties, which
presents a more fact-sensitive and targeted tool for policing overreaching in bond
workouts than the broad reading of section 316(b).
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INTRODUCTION
Bond workouts are famously dysfunctional. When a company is in
financial distress, its stockholders and bondholders have every reason to
negotiate a restructuring (or “workout”) of its obligations to produce a
sustainable capital structure and avoid the costs of a bankruptcy. The reality
is different. Bondholders hold out and free ride in response to restructuring
offers from distressed debtors. Debtors respond with coercive inducements
and procedural maneuvers. The result is a destabilizing and potentially toxic
mix of creditor opportunism and debtor coercion that can derail the workout
process, forcing a bankruptcy restructuring.
Bond workouts occupy a space governed by neither corporate law nor
bankruptcy law, regimes designed to bring unruly investors together to settle
matters by majority vote. In contrast, the law actually stands in the way of
majoritarian decisionmaking with bond workouts. The primary governing law
is the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (TIA), a hoary New Deal securities law that
mandates terms in the contracts governing publicly issued bonds.1 Section
316(b) of the TIA prohibits majority-vote amendments of the payment terms
of bonds, foreclosing workout by direct contractual amendment.2
But the TIA leaves open a second route to restructuring—the exchange
offer, in which the debtor offers to exchange new, scaled-down bonds for the
original bonds.3 Exchange offers are intrinsically susceptible to disruption by
holdout bondholders and coercive tactics by issuers. Few of the process
protections accorded by corporate and securities law to stockholders receiving
tender and exchange offers apply to bond exchanges.4 There is no judicial
oversight of the restructuring process, as would be the case in bankruptcy.
Nor does contract law provide in the way of protection against distorted
bargaining in a financial context like this one.
The TIA itself bears much of the responsibility for the empty doctrinal
toolbox. The TIA was a New Deal reaction to the excesses of a Depressionera out-of-court restructuring market in which insider equity holders and
their favored creditors siphoned value away from bondholders.5 The statute’s
drafters wanted restructurings to proceed in bankruptcy under judicial and
administrative oversight so as to prevent process abuses.6 They largely
15 U.S.C. § 77bbb (1939).
See infra text accompanying note 54.
Section 316(b) accomplishes this by omitting to mention exchange offers.
Stockholder protections are described in section II.A., infra; bondholder protections are
described in section II.B., infra.
5 See infra notes 57–58 and accompanying text (describing concerns raised in SEC report
regarding pre-TIA practices).
6 See infra note 56 and accompanying text (summarizing House and Senate reports
accompanying enactment of section 316(b)).
1
2
3
4
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succeeded. The TIA’s very success in shifting restructuring practice into
bankruptcy resulted in the atrophy of the federal equity doctrine that policed
earlier restructurings.7
In recent years, however, the picture has changed quietly but markedly.
Workouts have started to work. A substantial portion—around one-fifth of
restructuring activity—has shifted from bankruptcy court to out-of-court
workouts effected through exchange offers made only to large institutional
investors.8 The shift resulted from a temporary external shock—the brief
disappearance in 2008–2009 of debtor-in-possession financing for bankrupt
companies.9 But the altered pattern persists.
Coercive tactics figure more prominently than ever in the new workouts.
Ugly facts and court challenges result. Thus confronted, but possessing no
obvious doctrinal tool, courts in the Southern District of New York—the near
exclusive forum for bond litigation—responded by adopting a new reading of
TIA section 316(b) that would give courts broad power to police workouts.10
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently reversed the leading
Southern District case, likely returning the law of bond workouts to its earlier
posture.11 Even so, the episode was the biggest jolt to the normally staid world
of bond contracting since the leveraged takeovers and buyouts of the 1980s.
While we are sympathetic to the policing impulse behind the broad reading
of section 316(b), we think the broad reading went much too far. In a context
where fact-sensitive policing is needed, the broad reading imposed brightline mandates that overrode terms in bond contracts and threatened to choke
off the new workouts altogether.
This Article exploits the bond market’s reaction to these decisions to
reassess a longstanding debate in corporate finance regarding the desirability
of TIA section 316(b). Section 316(b) has attracted intense criticism in the
past, with calls for its amendment or repeal because of its untoward effects
on the workout process and tendency to push restructuring into costly
bankruptcy.12 Section 316(b) also has been staunchly defended on the ground
that mom-and-pop bondholders need protection from strong-arm tactics.13
We draw on a pair of original, hand-collected data sets to show that many
of the empirical assumptions made in the debate over section 316(b) no longer
7 See infra text accompanying note 293.
8 See infra text accompanying notes 164–70 (reviewing uptick in workout activity).
9 See infra text accompanying note 167.
10 Marblegate Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Educ. Mgmt. Corp., 111 F. Supp. 3d 542 (S.D.N.Y.

2015),
rev’d, 846 F.3d 1 (2d Cir. 2017).
11 Marblegate Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Educ. Mgmt. Corp., 846 F.3d 1 (2d Cir. 2017).
12 See infra text accompanying notes 104–06 (discussing viability of repeal).
13 See Victor Brudney, Corporate Bondholders and Debtor Opportunism: In Bad Times and Good, 105
HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1834-35 (1992) (describing the structural disabilities of dispersed bondholders).
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hold true. First, we show that workouts are more tractable than thought
heretofore. But for the recent judicial intervention in the Southern District,
the markets have learned to live with section 316(b), denuding the case for
repeal of any urgency.14 Workouts generally succeed, so there is no serious
transaction cost problem stemming from the TIA; when a company goes
straight into bankruptcy, there tend to be independent motivations.15 Second,
we show that workout by majority amendment will not systematically
disadvantage bondholders. Indeed, the recent turn to secured creditor control
of bankruptcy proceedings makes workouts all the more attractive to
unsecured bondholders. Third, we show that bond workouts are more coercive
than previously thought in some respects, but also less coercive in others.
Based on this empirical background we cautiously argue for the repeal of
section 316(b).16 Section 316(b) no longer does much work, even as it prevents
bondholders and bond issuers from realizing their preferences regarding modes
of restructuring and voting rules. We do not know what contracting equilibrium
would obtain in the wake of repeal, but think that the matter is best left to the
market. It follows that repeal should be complete and prospective. We
recognize, however, that markets are imperfect and that a free-contracting
regime may result in abuses. Accordingly, we argue that a repeal of section
316(b) should be accompanied by the resuscitation of a long forgotten, but still
valid, equity doctrine of intercreditor good faith duties, which presents a more
fact-sensitive and targeted tool for policing overreaching in bond workouts than
the Southern District’s broad reading of section 316(b).17
This Article makes several contributions to the scholarly literature on
corporate restructuring. First, the Article is the only comprehensive
treatment of bond workouts. Section 316(b) is a central topic in the law of
corporate finance, yet there has been no thorough inquiry into the practice
pattern. We go beyond anecdotal evidence to develop a working empirical
picture while simultaneously explaining the development of the applicable
law against the background of a theoretical discussion of group
decisionmaking by investors.
Second, the Article shows that there has been a marked change in the
world of debt restructuring, and that a cognizable part of restructuring
activity has moved outside of bankruptcy. We explain why the shift is
occurring, looking to securities law compliance practice and incentive
realignment in the wake of secured creditor control of Chapter 11
proceedings. We draw on an original data set to provide a first glimpse of the
14
15
16
17

See infra Section III.D.1.
See infra text accompanying notes 192–193 (discussing creditor control).
See infra Section IV.B.
See infra Section IV.D.
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new workouts. The descriptive data show that contemporary workouts are
flexibly structured and tend to succeed where those attempted before 2008
tended to fail. Specifically, we show that the holdout problem assumed by the
previous literature has diminished in salience and that the position of small
bondholders, to the extent they still exist, also looks different because they
are simply ignored in contemporary exchange offers, which are made only to
large institutional investors.
Our third contribution to the literature stems from a second original data
set that collects the process terms of contracts governing bonds issued under
the Rule 144A exemption and thus not subject to the TIA. The data offer a
glimpse at the preferences of bond issuers and bondholders, again upsetting
settled assumptions. We show that contracts issued prior to the recent judicial
opinions tend to adhere to the broad outlines of the section 316(b) regime,
but do introduce some significant modifications. Contracts issued after the
recent cases show a new pattern, one group carrying on as before, and another
affirmatively rejecting the Southern District’s broad reading of the TIA. The
contracts also take the surprising step of affirmatively sanctioning a coercive
device, the exit consent, utilized in exchange offers.
Finally, we play at legal archeology and rediscover a doctrinal tool better
suited to the policing task than the Southern District’s broad reading of the
TIA—the intercreditor duty of good faith, an equitable tool that became
irrelevant following the TIA’s passage. It sits on the books unremembered,
but it is amenable to revival under the contractual duty of good faith. The
recent turn to workouts points to the importance of reconsidering this doctrine.
Indeed, it likely will become essential in the event section 316(b) is repealed.
The Article has four parts. The first three look at practice and law along
parallel tracks, with the last part bringing them together. Part I lays out the
bargaining framework in bond workouts, explaining the array of distortionary
incentives and devices that come to bear and showing that, in theory,
majoritarian amendment is the least distorted framework. Part II reviews the
legal background, looking at the TIA, at other provisions of the federal
securities laws, and at contract law, and comparing the treatment of collective
decisionmaking by stockholders. It shows that there are precious few legal
constraints other than section 316(b), setting the stage for a game of creditor
opportunism and debtor coercion in connection with largely unregulated
exchange offers. Part III presents the first empirical profile of new workouts,
showing how it differs from the traditional picture of dysfunction. Part IV
begins by describing the rise and fall of the broad reading of section 316(b),
looking carefully at the facts of the cases. The analysis reveals an overbroad
and unpredictable standard likely to chill workouts garnering supermajority
consent. Part IV then turns to the ultimate policy question: what to do with
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section 316(b). We recommend outright repeal, but drawing on our empirical
evidence of drafting practice, warn that the contract drafters’ responses could
be incomplete. We suggest that the intercreditor duty of good faith, once
pulled out of the doctrinal wardrobe and given a good dusting, would provide
an effective solution to any resulting problems.
I. THE PROBLEM OF DISTORTED CHOICE IN BOND WORKOUTS
When corporate borrowers cannot pay, they seek to scale down (or
“restructure”) their financial obligations. In the United States, this tends to
occur in one of two venues. First, restructuring can take place in bankruptcy
court, under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Alternatively, the
restructuring can take place out of court in what is known as a “workout.”18 A
workout is simply a contractually concluded modification of debt effected
either by amendment of the terms of the existing debt or an exchange of the
existing debt for new obligations.19
Bankruptcy can be set in motion by unilateral action by the debtor. By
staying enforcement of debt contracts,20 bankruptcy forces creditors to the
negotiating table. Workouts call for more in the way of creditor cooperation.
For a company with a large number of individual, uncoordinated creditors—
such as tort claimants, trade creditors, and tax authorities—it may not even
be worth trying. Outside of bankruptcy, each individual creditor has a veto,
at least in regard to its own debt, while inside bankruptcy creditors are
grouped into classes within which a majority can bind a minority to a
restructuring and in some situations a majority of a single class can bind other
classes to a restructuring.21
Financial debt can be more tractable. Where there are multiple creditors
under the same debt instrument—principally bondholders and syndicated
lenders—the contract can provide for majoritarian amendment. Such provisions
are known as “collective action clauses” (CACs) when they condition amendment
of terms on a majority (or supermajority) creditor vote that binds dissenters.22

18 Workout, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed., 2014) (“A debtor’s agreement, usu[ally]
negotiated with a creditor or creditors out of court, to reduce or discharge the debt”).
19 WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 547 (8th ed. 2016).
20 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012).
21 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1126(b) (2012) (requiring only a single consenting class, not counting votes
of insiders, for cramdown confirmation). In some situations in bankruptcy, a debtor can bind
creditors without any of them consenting. See 11 U.S.C. § 1124(2) (2012) (treating as unimpaired
creditors whose debts are deaccelerated, cured, and reinstated); see also ADAM J. LEVITIN, BUSINESS
BANKRUPTCY: FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING AND MODERN COMMERCIAL MARKETS 542-43
(2015) (discussing “cramup”).
22 See Collective Action Clause, NASDAQ.COM, https://www.nasdaq.com/investing/glossary/c/
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There is, however, a more preclusive alternative. Under a “unanimous action
clause” (UAC),23 each creditor must individually consent to an amendment of
terms of its own obligation,24 preventing majoritarian amendment.
A UAC does not necessarily prevent out-of-court restructuring, however.
There is another route: the debtor firm can offer new, scaled-down obligations
in exchange for the old obligations, which are not amended directly, but are
instead canceled when they are returned to the debtor.25 A workout by
exchange offer still presupposes creditor cooperation, for each creditor retains
the choice of whether to exchange, and there is no legal mechanism outside
of bankruptcy by which exchange can be compelled.
The concessions bound up in a workout, whether by direct amendment
under a CAC or by an exchange offer, may enhance the creditors’ collective
interest. Publicly traded bonds present the classic case. They trade at a
discount to face value when the issuer gets into distress, reflecting the
possibility of default and bankruptcy. Bankruptcy entails added costs: direct
costs of administration and indirect costs due to the proceeding’s destabilizing
effect on the company’s customers, suppliers, and other constituents. A
negotiated reduction of the company’s debt burden potentially avoids these
costs, keeping the company out of bankruptcy by refitting it with a sustainable
debt load. The cost avoidance adds value to the company, making it possible
that the bonds will be worth more net of the concessions.
This all sounds nice and neat, but the playing field is bumpy, ridden by
problems of distorted consent-giving. This Part lays these problems out,
applying a powerful theoretical analysis articulated by Professor Zohar
Goshen, which we refer to as the “efficiency account.” Goshen’s basic
proposition is this: when corporate investors make collective decisions
impacting their investments’ value, the best available process is a binding
simple-majority vote.26 Such a voting process must satisfy a further
condition: the investors must vote sincerely, which means that they seek the

collective-action-clause [https://perma.cc/68FX-9FNA] (last visited Apr. 4, 2018) (“CAC allows
bondholders to agree on debt restructuring even when some bondholders are against restructuring
as long as majority agrees.”).
23 See William W. Bratton & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Reform and the Best Interest of
Creditors, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2004) (“[UACs] condition amendment of the bond contracts’
key payment terms on unanimous bondholder consent.”).
24 Technically, the reference to unanimity is a misnomer. UACs require a given bondholder to
consent before an amendment can be binding; they do not prevent a majority from making nonbinding
concessions. The appellation does make sense as a practical matter, since UACs generally condition
across-the-board application on unanimity, making workout by direct amendment unfeasible.
25 See Bratton & Gulati, supra note 23, at 21 (defining workout by exchange).
26 See Zohar Goshen, Controlling Strategic Voting: Property Rule or Liability Rule?, 70 S. CAL. L.
REV. 741, 749 (1997) (“[W]henever an individual’s action has implications for the group, that action
should be approved by a simple majority vote and decisions should be binding on the entire group.”).
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outcome that maximizes the investment’s value as a whole rather than seeking
to maximize their own individual returns.27
There is also a corollary proposition: any other process for effecting a
collective investor decision is presumptively infirm. The corollary does not
follow because majority decisionmaking is possessed of some magical
property that assures first-best results. No such template exists. Instead, the
point follows from negative implication—all other processes carry a higher
risk of distortionary influence.
With bonds, some distortions come from within the investor group, as
when the consenting bondholders have private agendas and vote strategically,
or, alternatively, hold out for a side deal. Other distortions come from the
bond issuer, which can inject coercive elements into the decisionmaking
process. Section A describes distortions from within the bondholder group,
while Section B turns to coercive tactics employed by bond issuers. Section
C describes negative implications for successful out-of-court restructuring.
A. Distortion From Other Bondholders
1. Voting Distortions: Self-Interest, Holding Out, and Misjudgment
Some voting distortions arise because of bondholder self-interest, holdout
strategies, or simple misjudgment. To understand how this works, assume
that Company ABC has outstanding $100 million 7% unsecured bonds—more
properly known as “notes” or “debentures”—due in two years.28 ABC has not
yet defaulted on its interest payments, but is experiencing severe business
difficulties, and default is a possibility. ABC does not expect to be in a position
to refinance the 7% bonds when they come due. The 7% bonds are trading for
$30, a deep discount from their $100 face value. Assume that the bond contract
contains a CAC permitting amendment, but only by approval of a 90%
supermajority of the bondholders. ABC has proposed a series of amendments to
scale down the bonds’ interest rate to 5%, reduce their principal amount (a
“haircut”) from $100 to $75, and extend their duration by three years. A
bondholder will be better off having consented so long as the bonds emerge
trading for more than $40. In fact, the amendments will cause the bonds to trade
at $50, and the deal allocates all surplus value created by the shift to a sustainable
capital structure to the bondholders. Consider the following three scenarios:
27 Id. at 745-46; see also Edward J. Janger & Adam J. Levitin, One Dollar, One Vote: Mark-toMarket Governance in Bankruptcy, 104 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (discussing the problem of
insincere voting in bankruptcy).
28 For the sake of consistency, we will refer to debt securities as “bonds” whether the credit
instrument is denominated as a “bond,” “debenture,” or “note,” and we will refer to the investors in
all such instruments as “bondholders.”
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(1) More than 10% of the bondholders either (a) have a more significant
interest in Company XYZ, which competes with Company ABC and will be
injured because the restructuring will make ABC stronger, (b) also own ABC
stock which will lose value to the bondholder favorable surplus allocation, (c)
hold a freely assignable put option on their bonds that will allow them to sell the
bonds at an above-market price at a future date, or (d) hold credit default swaps
on the bond that will pay off in aggregate more than the face amount of the bond
if the issuer defaults. They vote no and the beneficial deal is lost. The problem
here is self-interested, strategic voting activated by a conflict of interest.
(2) Two hedge funds, both of which understand this to be the best deal
available, each own 5.1% of the bonds and refuse to consent unless they receive
extra consideration on the side, from either the other bondholders or ABC.
No such consideration forthcoming, they vote no, and the deal is lost. The
hedge funds are voting strategically and self-interestedly, but there is no
conflict of interest as regards the transaction. The hedge funds are holding
out to extract disproportionate consideration.29
(3) The bondholders possess heterogeneous views about the
amendments. Although it is the best deal available, more than 10% misjudge
the situation, voting no because they believe that the surplus has been
allocated to the equity. Although they are voting sincerely, they are still
holding out, and their misjudgment kills the deal.30
The magnitude of each of these three problems, conflicted voting, holding
out, and misjudgment, diminishes as the approval threshold decreases to a
simple majority. If we could identify and disqualify conflicted voters and
holdouts without incurring collateral costs, we should do so, for they detract
from the collective good. We should at the same time distinguish sincere
misjudgment from conflicts and holding out. Misjudgments about transaction
quality are an inevitable incident of contracting under imperfect information
against an uncertain future. One can ameliorate, but not eliminate, the
problem by disclosing fully regarding the debtor’s business prospects.
2. Free Riding
Let us now bring a UAC into the fact pattern. The UAC blocks majority
or super-majority amendment of payment terms. It follows that ABC can only
restructure by closing an exchange offer.
Exchange offers work only if enough bondholders accept them. Assume
ABC authorizes $75 million 5% unsecured bonds due in seven years and offers
to exchange $75 face value of the new bonds for each $100 of old ones. If only
29
30

Goshen, supra note 26, at 755.
Id. at 756.
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a few bondholders refuse to exchange, the new bonds will trade for more than
$40. But supermajority acceptance will be necessary in order for the deal to
make sense. An exchange of 51% of the old bonds for the scaled-down bonds
will not achieve a reduction in the debt load of a magnitude sufficient to avoid
bankruptcy. Nor would the new bonds, with their reduced financial rights,
trade for more than $40. The offer accordingly will be conditioned on a 90%
supermajority tender threshold.
The supermajority minimum tender creates the same potential for
disruption from conflicts, holding out, and misjudgment as did the 90%
supermajority vote. In addition, the shift from collective voting to bilateral
contracting between ABC and individual bondholder-offerees opens up an
additional distortionary possibility. A nontendering bondholder cannot have
its bonds amended. If the offer succeeds, there will emerge two groups of
bondholders, one holding the old bonds and the other the new bonds.
Holding out can make sense, even absent a side payment, because there is a
potential free ride at the expense of the majority that tenders and takes the
scaled-down rights.31 If the exchange offer closes and the issuer emerges from
financial distress, the original, unexchanged bond will be worth more than
the scaled-down new bond given to exchanging bondholders. Furthermore, if
the issuer emerges in stronger financial condition, the unamended bond is
worth more ex post than ex ante.32 Add all of this up, and a successful
restructuring through an exchange offer that is effectuated by less than 100%
of the bondholders effects a wealth transfer from the cooperative bondholders
to the uncooperative bondholders. The holdouts are able to free ride off of
the concessions made by the exchanging bondholders. If enough bondholders
try to free ride, however, then the minimum tender threshold will not be
reached, and the exchange offer will fail. All other things else equal,
amendment by a binding majority vote works better than does an exchange
offer, because a majority vote leaves the bondholders in a single group with
scaled-down rights, cutting off the free ride.
B. Distortion from Issuers
Now let us shift over to the other side and view the transaction from
Company ABC’s perspective, make the deal a bad one, and see what ABC can
do to coerce the bondholders into taking it anyway.

31 See id. at 757 (“Therefore, if as a result of the reorganization the value of the original bonds
is greater than the value of the new bonds . . . the rational bondholder will prefer to sit back and
watch the other bondholders offer their bonds while she takes a free ride.”).
32 See id. at 785-86 (discussing the risks and benefits that a bondholder may face when refusing
to tender prior to closing).
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Exchange offers are inherently coercive because they threaten the liquidity
of the old bonds. The liquidity of a bond is a function of how widely it is held.
A successful exchange inherently reduces the number of bondholders of the
old bonds, and thus their liquidity, resulting in a loss of market value. Indeed,
a listed issue can be delisted.33 This threat encourages bondholders to accept
the exchange offer even without any deliberate coercion by issuers.
Issuers rarely rely on the implicit coercion of illiquidity alone, however.
An exchange offer is a species of tender offer, and the tender offer form invites
coercion because (1) it forces each member of the offeree group to act
individually rather than by a collective decisionmaking procedure, and (2) it
splits the offerees into two groups, permitting an offer to be structured so
that opponents who refuse to consent are left in a worse position. Issuers take
advantage of these properties, deploying both substantive and procedural
sticks and carrots to encourage acceptance.
1. Sticks: Exit Consents
Bond contracts contain a variety of provisions designed to protect the
right to payment. Many of these protective provisions in bondholder
contracts are open to majority amendment even when the payment terms are
subject to a UAC.34 Issuers frequently condition bondholders’ tenders in
exchange offers on the execution of a consent (an “exit consent”) to amend or
remove these provisions. Business covenants can usually be amended or
eliminated by a simple majority vote under the bond contract and, in the case
of a secured bond, collateral can usually be stripped with a two-thirds vote.35
Thus, in an exit consent transaction, a bondholder is invited to exchange the
old bond for a new one, but is allowed to do so only after first consenting to
an amendment of the terms of the old bond. This move distorts the
bondholder’s choice. Even if the holder would reject the offer based on an
appraisal of its value, the holder might nonetheless accept to avoid being stuck
with an old bond with diminished rights and no liquidity in the event the
other bondholders accept and the offer succeeds.
Note that this tactic is not injurious per se. The stripping of rights by the
exiting bondholders lowers the free ride payoff from refusing to tender,
discouraging self-interested holding out within the investor group and
33 See N.Y. Stock Exch., NYSE Listed Company Manual § 801.00 (2018), http://wallstreet.cch.com/
LCMTools/bookmark.asp?id=sx-ruling-nyse-policymanual_1&manual=/Lcm/sections/lcm-sections/
[https://perma.cc/NHB6-EWMX] (last visited Apr. 4, 2018) (“Securities admitted to the list may be . . .
removed from the list at any time that a company falls below certain . . . listing criteria.”).
34 See John C. Coffee, Jr. & William A. Klein, Bondholder Coercion: The Problem of Constrained
Choice in Debt Tender Offers and Recapitalizations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1207, 1224-25 (1991) (noting that
bondholders can eliminate protective covenants).
35 See infra text accompanying note 211.

1610

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 166: 1597

making it more likely that a fair offer succeeds. Given a fair offer, the exiting
bondholders have every reason to consent to the amendment. Once the
bondholder thus decides to cooperate with the issuer, the bondholder will see
anything that lowers the value of old bonds left in circulation after the offer’s
conclusion as adding value to the new bonds.36
2. Sticks: Differential Consideration
Issuers also can use procedural machinations to coerce acceptance of
exchange offers. Absent regulation, an issue may keep an offer open only a
short time, so as to discourage a coordinated response by bondholders.
Higher consideration can be offered for earlier tenders toward the same end.
Finally, disfavored bondholders can be excluded altogether from the set of
offerees, facilitating side deals with self-interested bondholders.
3. Carrots: Terms of the New Bonds
Attractive terms can be included in the new bonds at the expense of the old
bonds. Suppose Company ABC offers to exchange the $100 7% old bond due in
two years for a $75 face value 8% new bond due in seven years with a junior lien
on its property. The 100 basis point interest step up adds a little sweetener
without erasing the fact that the new bonds carry lesser financial rights. The
lien does even more. Should bankruptcy follow for ABC despite a successful
exchange offer, the new bonds will therein rank prior to the old bonds, making
the lien a stick as well as a carrot. The same could be accomplished by inserting
a subordination provision into the old bonds via the exit consents, so that the
old bonds would be explicitly subordinated to the new bonds.
4. Carrots: Consent Fees and Vote-Buying
Coercion can also occur in connection with a majority bondholder vote.
The issuer can skew preferences by paying a consideration, known as a
“consent fee,” to those voting its way. The consent fee, like the exit consent,
splits the bondholders into two groups and leaves the nonconsenting
bondholders in a worse position. Given a 51% CAC, the issuer can pay a
majority of bondholders to approve an amendment that makes the bonds as a
whole less valuable but leaves the payees better off net of the payment. If the
bondholders cannot coordinate to resist, the issuer can even induce an
amendment that leaves each consenting bondholder less well-off, but still willing

36 See Goshen, supra note 26, at 785 (explaining why bondholders will vote for an amendment
that will ostensibly decrease bond value).
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to vote yes and take the money for fear that a simple majority of other
bondholders will do likewise.
C. Implications and Correctives
Exchange offers put bondholders in an unstable situation. They are forced
to choose even as the value of the outcome depends on choices made by other
members of the group, as well as the issuer’s prospects. Holding out and
taking a free ride may look attractive, even given exit consents. But, it is a
dangerous game. If enough bondholders refuse to tender and the minimum
condition is not met, then the offer fails. If a successful offer would have
averted bankruptcy, everybody might be worse off. Exit consents make this
result less likely, but they too have a dark side. Suppose a successful
restructuring does indeed create a surplus, but the issuer has structured the
terms of the new bonds such that the entire surplus redounds to the benefit
of its stockholders. Here, considered judgment counsels holding out.
Unfortunately, given an exit consent, refusing to tender on the merits invites
punishment in the form of impaired terms in the event the other members of
the group buckle and accept. It is a game without an equilibrium solution as the
bondholders choose between holding out and a high payoff, and cooperation and a
lower payoff, all against the threat of failure and a still lower payoff for everybody.
Meanwhile, all of the issuer “sticks” just described admit of a simple
corrective. In order for group consents to be collected without coercion, each
member must be allowed to register its preference without consequences tied
to the outcome. This takes us back to the theoretical baseline—the best way
to get the investor group from here to there is by simple majority vote
conducted without side payments by the issuer. Such a vote also minimizes
problems arising from holdouts, free riders, conflicts, and misjudgment. But
problems will remain, particularly as regards the latter two. Conflicts that are
difficult to detect can occur in large segments of a voting population. Sound
judgment depends on (but is not guaranteed by) complete information, a
commodity not necessarily forthcoming from transactional proponents.
II. REGULATORY CONSTRAINTS
If corporate and securities law followed the efficiency account articulated
in Part I, all collective decisionmaking by security holders, whether
stockholders or bondholders, would be subject to a norm of sincere voting
and a blanket prohibition of coercive tactics. But that’s not how it works.
There is a pattern. First comes a duty-driven state law base under corporate
and contract law. Under this, absent a fiduciary or contractual duty to be
solicitous of the interests of the corporate issuer or the other securities holders
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in a group, nothing prohibits self-interested voting. Nor, absent a standalone
duty, is issuer coercion prohibited. The base is modified by a hodgepodge of
provisions in federal securities law pursuing the goal of undistorted investor
choice. These constraints tend to take the form of bright-line rules.
The rules covering stockholders and bondholders differ markedly in their
details, even as both follow the same pattern. The comparison is instructive.
Generally, stockholders are better protected than are bondholders because
corporate law contains an overlay of fiduciary duty where contract law does
not. Stockholders are also more likely to benefit from the regulatory
solicitude of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). But there is
also a formative federal intervention on the bondholder side. Under section
316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act, payment terms in bond contracts may not
be amended directly.37 Workouts accordingly proceed only by means of
exchange offer. Ironically, both self-interested voting and issuer coercion
come to the forefront of the practice as a result. Courts have refused
invitations to invoke the contractual duty of good faith against them.
Section A outlines the treatment of stockholder decisionmaking. Section
B moves up the right side of the balance sheet to bonds, focusing on federal
law, in particular TIA section 316(b). Section C then analyzes the contractual
duty of good faith as applied to bonds. Section D explains the overall pattern.
It shows that investor self-interest and issuer coercion present targets illsuited to control under open-ended common law standards. No easily drawn
lines distinguish “proper” from “improper” self-interest or coercion. The
efficiency account, even as it works on the whole, provides no assistance.
A. Stockholders
Corporate law’s voting defaults are majoritarian,38 minimizing frictions
from holdouts and other problems related to supermajority thresholds. But
self-interested shareholder voting is not prohibited. Shareholders do not owe
one another fiduciary duties and private agendas do not lead to

37 See 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(b) (1990) (“The right of any holder of any indenture security to
receive payment of the principal of and interest on such indenture security . . . shall not be impaired
or affected without the consent of such holder.”).
38 See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 216(2) (2018) (“In all matters other than the election of
directors, the affirmative vote of the majority of shares present in person or represented by proxy at
the meeting and entitled to vote on the subject matter shall be the act of the stockholders.”). It is
noted that supermajority provisions governing charter and bylaw amendments are nonetheless very
common. See e.g., What’s (Really) Hot: A Quick Score Analysis of 2015’s Real Governance Trends,
INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, https://www.issgovernance.com/whats-really-hotquickscore-analysis-2015s-real-governance-trends/ [https://perma.cc/7HS9-JJQD] (last visited Apr.
4, 2018) (questioning the “common wisdom” that it is rare for a supermajority vote to be required to
amend corporate governing documents).
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disqualification. The only exception to the rule of self-interest addresses votebuying, which breaks the overall regulatory pattern.39 But only outright
exchanges of cash for proxies clearly traverse the prohibition. Other
arrangements, such as side deals that inject an element of self-interest into
the tally, can pass if fully disclosed.40
Fiduciary scrutiny is triggered when a shareholder has voting control of the
company.41 But the inquiry does not focus on the vote itself. It takes controlled
boardroom action leading to unequal outcomes rather than self-interested
voting per se to trigger scrutiny.42 That said, self-interested shareholder voting
does arouse a response at a secondary level—the votes of a fiduciary seeking
a shareholder ratification to shield a self-dealing transaction from fiduciary
review are dropped from the tally.43
The federal securities laws, in contrast, do seek to ensure undistorted
consent-giving, although their coverage is intermittent. The primary
contribution concerns information, the full production of which is mandated
by the periodic disclosure system and the proxy rules.44 There is also process
regulation of third-party tender offers, which are subject to the same coercive tactics
employed in distressed debt exchanges.45 The Williams Act, 46 added in 1968 to the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (‘34 Act), subjects tender offers to a package

39 See, e.g., Chew v. Inverness Mgmt. Corp., 352 A.2d 426, 430 (Del. Ch. 1976) (disallowing votes cast
in a board election by shareholders who obtained options to purchase shares in exchange for consideration).
40 The exception has narrowed over time. See Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17, 17 (Del. Ch.
1982) (permitting a loan inducing a vote). What was once an open-ended standard generally directed
to voting for consideration recently has taken on rule-like characteristics. See Portnoy v. Cryo-Cell
Int’l, Inc., 940 A.2d 43, 68 (Del. Ch. 2008) (rejecting an intrinsic fairness test in favor of a
distinction between improper and permissible inducement for voting).
41 See infra note 42 and accompanying text (describing the prevailing case where a controlling
shareholder fiduciary duty was imposed).
42 The classic case is Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971), where the Delaware
Supreme Court held that board control implies a duty against “self-dealing,” defined as taking
something to the exclusion or detriment of the minority shareholders. Id. at 720-21.
43 See Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 653-654 (Del. 2014) (holding that approval
of a majority of the minority shareholders was required in a cash-out merger); Lewis v. Vogelstein,
699 A.2d 327, 335-36 (Del. 1997) (requiring a majority of disinterested shareholders to approve a
director self-dealing transaction).
44 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1, 14b-2 (1970). The federal securities laws now also mandate sincere
voting on the part of institutional intermediaries. See Proxy Voting by Investment Advisors, 17
C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-6 (2003) (requiring investment advisers to adopt policies reasonably designed
to ensure that the adviser votes proxies in the best interest of clients). Significantly, this innovation
follows not from a revision of shareholder voting norms, but from a revision of the norms governing
the relationship between fund managers and their beneficiaries. It thus follows from fiduciary duty
and conforms to the overall pattern.
45 Goshen, supra note 26, at 766-68.
46 See Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d),
78m(e), 78n(d)-(f) (2012)).

1614

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 166: 1597

of bright-line rules designed to minimize coercion. The rules control an offer’s
timing and require equal treatment of all members of the stockholder group.47
State corporate law also inhibits coercive tactics of tender offerors, but as
an incident of fiduciary constraint of management defensive tactics.48
Coercion is thus deterred indirectly because it gives management a
justification for defensive barriers. Tender offers by majority shareholders
also come in for special constraint against coercion, again as an incident of a
fiduciary duty—in this case the controlling shareholder’s duty.49 Under this
regime, a majority of the minority must accept the offer, the independent
directors of the target must get the chance to engage a banker and pronounce
on price fairness, and the offeror must commit to go forward with a cash-out
merger at the same price and abjure retributive treatment of the holdouts.50
B. Bondholders—Federal Law
With bondholders, we reverse order and begin with the federal overlay.
The reversal follows from the magnitude of the federal intervention, which
restricts the contracting space. The TIA mandates terms in the contracts,
called “trust indentures,” that govern publicly issued bonds, including terms

17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13e-4(f)(8)(i)-(ii), 240.14d-10(a)(1)-(2) (2017).
See, e.g., Unitrin, Inc. v. Amer. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1356 (Del. 1995) (“The Court of
Chancery should have directed its enhanced scrutiny: first, upon whether the Repurchase Program
the Unitrin Board implemented was draconian, by being either preclusive or coercive and . . . if it
was not . . . upon whether it was within a range of reasonable responses to the threat”); Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 1985) (“[W]e are satisfied that the [defensive]
device Unocal adopted is reasonable in relation to the threat posed, and that the board acted in the
proper exercise of sound business judgment.”).
49 The Delaware courts backed into this result after the Delaware Supreme Court, as a matter
of statutory construction, barred fiduciary review of minority shareholder cash-out mergers in cases
where the majority holds ninety percent or more of the shares. See Glassman v. Unocal Exploration
Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 248 (Del. 2001) (“[A]bsent fraud or illegality, appraisal is the exclusive remedy
available to a minority stockholder who objects to a short-form merger.”). Majority shareholders
holding less than ninety percent thereafter evaded direct fiduciary scrutiny of their mergers by
conducting antecedent tender offers to bring themselves up to the ninety percent threshold. The
Delaware courts thereafter adjusted with an anticoercion rule applied to the antecedent tender offer.
50 In re Pure Res., Inc. S’holder Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 445 (Del. Ch. 2002).
47
48
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facilitating workouts.51 The Bankruptcy Code goes on to block contract
enforcement52 and channel restructuring into a judicially supervised process.
1. Amendment: TIA Section 316
Section 316 of the TIA addresses bondholder waivers and amendments
under trust indentures, seeking to prevent distorted decisionmaking by taking
the decision itself off of the table. Subsection (a) contains two provisions. One
of them constrains majoritarian forgiveness of interest defaults by allowing only
a payment moratorium not exceeding three years based on a seventy-five
percent bondholder majority.53 The second provision is a limited prohibition
against self-interested voting, requiring that votes of the issuer and anyone
controlling, controlled by, or under common control with the issuer be
disregarded. Subsection (b) applies to amendments, providing as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of the indenture to be qualified, the
right of any holder of any indenture security to receive payment of the
principal of and interest on such indenture security, on or after the respective
due dates expressed in such indenture security, or to institute suit for the
enforcement of any such payment on or after such respective dates, shall not
be impaired or affected without the consent of such holder, except as to a
postponement of an interest payment consented to as provided in paragraph
(2) of subsection (a) of this section . . . .54

51 Bonds involve two separate contracts: a note, which is a promise from the bond issuer to
repay the bond, and an indenture. The indenture creates a common enforcement mechanism for all
of the bonds through an entity called an “indenture trustee,” who is to represent the interests of the
dispersed bondholders. Although there need not be any actual trust corpus, the term is a holdover
from older practice when bonds were generally secured and the collateral was held in trust. As a
result, the indentures are often called “trust indentures,” hence the name “Trust Indenture Act.”
The term “indenture” refers to the contract itself—an indenture is merely a contract written with a
primitive antifraud device consisting of two counterparts of the contract written on the same sheet
of paper or parchment, which would then be cut in two, so as to divide the counterparts. The cut
would be made with a set of zigzagged indents, hence the name indenture. The idea was that the
two counterparts would have to fit together like Little Orphan Annie’s locket or the Passover
afikomen, which would protect against fraudulent documents. Obviously, such devices are not in use
today, but the term has persisted.
52 See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012) (barring legal claims and other means of contract enforcement
against individuals and entities who file for bankruptcy, except for those actions explicitly
permitted under the statute).
53 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(a) (1990). Subsection (a) also provides that bondholder majorities must
be permitted to direct enforcement proceedings conducted by the indenture trustee.
54 15 U.S. C. § 77ppp(b) (1990).
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The section prevents majorities from binding minorities to amendments
of terms implicating “the right to receive payment,” sometimes called the
“core” terms of the indenture. It does not prevent unilateral consent giving
by individual bondholders. If an issue is held by a large number of
bondholders and ninety-nine percent consent to remove a core term, the
reduction still goes through, but only as to the consenting bondholders. The
section, in effect, imposes a mandatory UAC that covers some but not all
terms in the indenture. As to “non-core” terms there is no prohibition under
the TIA, and trust indentures tend to cover them with simple majority CACs.
Despite the different treatment of “core” and “non-core” terms, the TIA does
not define what indenture terms are part of the core “right to receive
payment.” The promises to pay principal and interest, including payment
dates and currency of payment, are clearly in the “core,” as they constitute the
heart of bondholders’ right to receive payment—the what and when. The
location of the line separating “core” from “non-core” terms has recently
become a matter of interpretive dispute, particularly because the words
“impair” and “affect” imply a further prohibitive reach to TIA section 316(b).
We will take up these matters in Part IV.
Whatever its reach, section 316(b)’s blunt mandate against majority vote
amendment is surprising. Indeed, the section makes no sense when viewed
through the lens of Part I’s efficiency account, which concludes that
amendment by majority vote is the least distorted context for out-of-court
restructuring.55 For an explanation, we need to look to the historical context.
The House and Senate reports accompanying the TIA offer the same
(verbatim) statement of purpose for section 316(b): “Evasion of judicial
scrutiny of the fairness of debt-readjustment plans is prevented by this
prohibition.”56 “Evasion” occurred when payment terms were amended in
See supra Part I.A.
S. REP. NO. 75-1619, at 19 (1939); S. REP. NO. 76-248, at 26 (1939); H.R. REP. NO. 76-1016,
at 56 (1939). There also was a purpose to synchronize the TIA’s regime of mandatory terms with
state-based legal regimes that required an unconditional promise to pay in order to import
negotiability. See, e.g., ARTHUR W. SELOVER, THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 1 (1900)
(identifying the purpose of the Negotiable Instruments Law as a “codification of the principle rules
of law governing negotiable instruments”). Section 316’s rights-based language derives from this
concern. The formulation came from contemporary trust indentures and was designed to assure
negotiability. AM. B. FOUND., COMMENTARIES ON MODEL DEBENTURE INDENTURE
PROVISIONS 1965: MODEL INDENTURE PROVISIONS ALL REGISTERED ISSUES 1967 AND
CERTAIN NEGOTIABLE PROVISIONS WHICH MAY BE INCORPORATED IN A PARTICULAR
INCORPORATING INDENTURE 234 (1971). CACs applicable to payment terms were thought to
undercut negotiability by interjecting uncertainty as to sum. But opinion was mixed. See De Forest
Billyou, Corporate Mortgage Bonds and Majority Clauses, 57 YALE L.J. 595, 600-02 (1948) (arguing that
a five-year postponement of principal and interest based on a three-quarters vote would not run
afoul of the law); see also Robert T. Swaine, Reorganization of Corporations: Certain Developments Over
the Last Decade, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 927 (1927) (opining that no action clauses precluding
55
56
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out-of-court workouts. The reasons for concern are set out in the SEC’s
famous report on protective and reorganization committees, supervised by an
all-star team of William O. Douglas, Abe Fortas, and Jerome Frank—among
these three, two would become SEC Chairmen, two would become Supreme
Court justices, and one would become a Second Circuit judge.
The SEC Report detailed the recent appearance of CACs covering
payment terms in new bonds issued in connection with workouts in the real
estate sector. The express purpose of the provisions was to substitute faster,
cheaper workouts for bankruptcy proceedings.57 The Report took a close look
at the real estate bond indentures58 along with CACs in bond documentation
in Canada and Great Britain,59 accurately stating the policy case in their favor.60
For the SEC reporters, the problem was not that CACs were intrinsically
distortionary, but that they would exacerbate distortionary influences in the thenprevailing institutional context. The reporters had nothing against majoritarian
concession-making, provided that it was exercised on a fair playing field.
The federal bankruptcy regime had only included corporate
reorganization since 1934,61 when Congress added section 77B to the
Bankruptcy Act.62 Section 77B had dual purposes that stood in tension with
one another.63 The first purpose was facilitative—creditor majorities now, for
the first time, could bind creditor minorities to reorganization plans that
impaired the minorities’ contract rights, making reorganization easier to
accomplish.64 The second purpose was to assure a playing field that would be
individual suit presented “a serious question whether they do not destroy the negotiability of the
obligations affected by them”).
57 See 3 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM’N, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND
INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE
AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES 227 (1936) (“By virtue of the[se provisions’] voluntary
features, the expense and delay of foreclosure or other court proceedings are to be avoided.”).
58 See id. at 225-28; 6 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM’N, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND
INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE
AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES 143-51 (1936).
59 Id. at 137-43.
60 See id. at 147-48. (“To assume that the holder of a single bond out of a large issue is entitled to block
a constructive program favored by the overwhelming majority of his fellow investors, is to cling to a conception
of rights which has no application to the modern methods of issuing and distributing securities.”).
61 For a description of the pre-1934 regime of equity receivership, see DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S
DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 56-69 (2003); Stephen J. Lubben,
Railroad Receiverships and Modern Bankruptcy Theory, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1420, 1441-43 (2004).
62 Act of June 7, 1934, § 77B, 48 Stat. 911 (repealed 1938).
63 See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Reorganization Through Bankruptcy: A Remedy for What?, 10 J. NAT’L ASS’N
REF. BANKR. 46, 46 (1936) (describing the competing interests Congress sought to accommodate in 1934).
64 See Developments in the Law: Reorganization under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act: 1934–
1936, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1111, 1185 (1936) (“One of the chief purposes of enacting Section 77B
undoubtedly was to overcome the necessity of holding a judicial sale and paying dissenting creditors
the value of their claims in cash—a technique apparently necessary in ‘consent’ receiverships, but
often a bar to carrying out an effective reorganization. Section 77B has met these difficulties in part
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protective of the interests of smaller bondholders and other security holders,
an assurance to be effectuated through judicial process oversight and judicial
application of substantive standards.65
Section 77B succeeded in facilitation but failed in protection, despite
judicial supervision. The corporate insiders and investment bankers who had
been stage-managing nonbankruptcy receiverships in the decades before 1934
transitioned to bankruptcy reorganization without missing a beat, continuing
to use the process vehicle of protective committees to control every important
aspect of bankruptcy proceedings.66 Unfortunately, protective committees
were not very protective of their participating bondholders.67 There resulted
out-of-control agency costs on the part of those responsible for framing
restructuring plans and strategic distortion of consent-giving processes. The
SEC Report devoted hundreds of pages to detailing the abuses.68 A
proliferation of CACs would have facilitated the protective committees’
survival. Section 316(b)’s CAC prohibition followed in 1939.
Significantly, the TIA’s progenitors knew both that their scheme
implicated a tradeoff in the form of additional bankruptcy costs69 and that
CACs prevailed in other systems.70 They also knew that the buyers of new
bond issues tended to be institutional investors and that mom-and-pop
bondholders had more or less disappeared from the Depression-era market’s
by providing that a plan accepted by ‘creditors holding two thirds in amount of the claims of each
class’ binds all in the class when confirmed by the court’s decree.”).
65 Act of June 7, 1934, § 77B, 48 Stat. 911, 920-22 (repealed 1938); see also Dodd, supra note 63,
at 56-61 (describing the objectives of small claimants and showing how the section 77B process was
supposed to satisfy those objectives, but predicting that judges would continue to rule in favor of
insiders and creditor majorities).
66 See Richard W. Jennings, Mr. Justice Douglas: His Influence on Corporate and Securities
Regulation, 73 YALE L.J. 920, 936 (1964) (“With a plan of reorganization prepared in advance by the
lawyers for the Committee and the necessary consents in hand, courts generally could be prevailed
upon to confirm the plan against attacks of unfairness on the theory that the creditors and
shareholders had freely consented and were in the best position to protect their own interests. The
whole affair thus became a ‘lawless’ operation masquerading under a facade of legitimacy. The larger
question was whether the machinery of government was capable of making any lasting and effective
reforms in this traditionally chaotic field.”).
67 The effect was ironic given the inclusion in section 77B of a provision allowing courts to
disregard prebankruptcy protective committees’ main tool for binding creditors: the depository
agreement. Act of June 7, 1934, § 77B, 48 Stat. 911,915 (repealed 1938).
68 See, e.g., 1 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM’N, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND
INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE
AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES 506-96 (1937) (describing coercive tactics employed against
bondholders); id. at 863-83 (describing insider and underwriter control and rent-seeking motivations
on the part of their opponents).
69 See supra note 57 and accompanying text (showing an understanding that CACs save the
time and expenses associated with bankruptcy hearings).
70 See supra text accompanying note 59 (demonstrating knowledge of the widespread use of
CACs in Canada and Great Britain).
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buy side.71 They traded all of this in pursuit of the ideal of a system in which
investors make undistorted choices, an ideal they thought realizable only
given some sort of supervision by an omniscient, neutral administrator.
2. Exchange Offers
Section 316(b)’s protective purpose was never realized due to a critical
omission. The TIA does not constrain exchange offers, which emerged as the
exclusive vehicle for out-of-court workouts after 1939, complete with almost
every distortionary feature described in Part I—holdouts, exit consents,
differential consideration, sweeteners, and consent fees. Federal law imposes
only a single anticoercive restraint, going to timing. The Williams Act72
requires the issuer to hold open both offer and any exit consent for twenty
days and an additional ten days in case of an extension.73 But the Williams
Act’s other process protections do not apply to offers for debt securities.74
Therefore, exchange offers accordingly do not have to be made to all holders75
and can address only a limited group of bondholders. Nor is the issuer
required to pay the same and highest consideration under the offer to all

71 See Trust Indenture Act of 1939: Hearing on H.R. 2191 & H.R. 5220 Before the Subcomm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 76th Cong. 76-77 (1939) (statement of John K. Starkweather,
Chairman of the Federal Legislation Committee of the Investment Bankers’ Association of America)
(“I would say today it probably is a very safe assumption to say that from 50 to 75 percent of the
desirable issues are going into the hands of insurance companies or banks.”). In 1933, however,
Jerome Frank, one of the drafters of the SEC report, infamously wrote, “Courts of equity have a
tradition of aiding the helpless, such as infants, idiots and drunkards. The average security holder
in a corporate reorganization is of like kind.” Jerome Frank, Reflections on Corporate Reorganizations, 19
VA. L. REV. 541, 569 (1933).
72 Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), 78m(e), 78n(d)–
(f) (1982)). The Williams Act requires that the offer stay open twenty days, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1
(2008), that tenders may be withdrawn at any time prior to the offer closing, that the offer go to all
holders, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13e-4(f)(8)(i), 240.14d-10(a)(1) (2008), and that all tenders be paid the
highest consideration on offer. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13e-4(f)(8)(ii), 240.14d-10(a)(2) (2008).
73 Rule 14e-1 under section 14(e) of the 1934 Act requires that tender offers be held open for
twenty business days, and an additional ten business days from the date of a change in terms. 17
C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (2008). In a case where the exchange offer carries an exit consent, this requirement
prevents the issuer from putting through the contract amendment ahead of closing the exchange offer.
74 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(e), 78n(d)(1), 240.13e-4(a)(2) (2008) (defining issuer tender offer as an
offer for equity securities); 15 U.S.C. § 240.14d-1(a) (2008) (remitting tender offers to debt securities
to Regulation 14E); E.H.I., Inc. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 652 F.2d 310, 313-15 (3d Cir. 1981) (addressing
17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1); Royce de R. Barondes, An Economic Analysis of the Potential for Coercion in
Consent Solicitations for Bonds, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 749, 762-65 (1994) (“However, the requirements
that an offer be made to all holders, that the highest consideration paid in the tender offer be paid
to all holders who tender and that partial offers be prorated generally would not apply to debt tender
offers”). The upshot is that an offer of straight debt is subject to Regulation 14E, and Rules 14e-1,
14e-2, and 14e-3—the twenty-day rule and the antifraud rules. However, exchange offers paying cash
or debt convertible into equity must comply with the full-dress requirements in Rule 13e-4.
75 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13e-4(f)(8)(i), 240.14d-10(a)(1) (1999).
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tendering bondholders.76 Instead, the offer can be structured to pay more for
early tenders, hustling the bondholders to accede.
C. Bondholders—Contract Law
State contract law adds little in the way of supplemental protection, apart
from leaving the drafters of trust indentures the option of including explicit terms
that foreclose the possibility of exchange offers and coercive processes. Contract’s
supplemental policing doctrine, the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing,77
turns a blind eye to coercive tactics in the corporate finance context.
The good faith axiom generally receives only lip service from the courts
in the context of bonds. The courts proceed from an assumption that the
parties to these contracts are sophisticated and can bargain for the terms they
want.78 They accordingly have held that the implied duty of good faith derives
directly from the language of the indenture. It follows that the good faith
duty can be implied only when directly supported by an express term79 and
cannot provide bondholders with rights inconsistent with the indenture’s
express terms.80 Thus formulated, the duty loses its gap-filling quality. This
See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13e-4(f)(8)(ii), 240.14d-10(a)(2) (1999) (discussing security holders’ rights).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 205 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
See, e.g., Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691 F.2d 1039, 1049 (2d Cir.
1982) (“Contract language is thus the starting point in the search for meaning . . . Sharon’s literalist
approach simply proves too much.”); Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.3d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986)
(“Arrangements among a corporation, the underwriters of its debt, trustees under its indentures and
sometimes ultimate investors are typically thoroughly negotiated and massively documented . . .
The terms of the contractual relationships agreed to and not broad concepts such as fairness define
the corporation’s obligation to its bondholders”).
79 When the issuer acts in accordance with the indenture’s express provisions, good faith claims
are foreclosed. See, e.g., Aaron Ferer & Sons Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 731 F.2d 112,
126 (2d Cir. 1984) (“All of Williams & Glyn’s claims are barred by its release, knowingly and
voluntarily given.”); Banco Urquijo, S.A. v. Signet Bank, 861 F. Supp. 1220, 1249 (M.D. Pa. 1994)
(“Moreover, a fiduciary relationship does not arise from a lender participation agreement unless the
agreement expressly provides for such a relationship.”); Banque Arabe et Internationale
d’Investissement v. Md. Nat’l Bank, 819 F. Supp. 1282, 1296 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (“[T]his Court has been
unable to find, and the plaintiff has not identified, any section of the Participation Agreement or
related documents which creates such a [fiduciary] duty.”); Banco Español de Credito v. Sec. Pac.
Nat’l Bank, 763 F. Supp. 36, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“In the case of arm’s length transactions between
large financial institutions, no fiduciary relationship exists unless one was created in the agreement.”).
80 See e.g., Broad v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 957 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (“We note
first that this implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot give the holders of Debentures
any rights inconsistent with those explicitly set out in the Indenture.”); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR
Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1517 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (refusing to impose an “unbounded and onesided” duty to the terms of an indenture); Gardner & Florence Call Cowells Found. v. Empire, Inc.,
589 F. Supp. 669, 673 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), vacated on procedural grounds, 754 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1985)
(finding no breach of an implied covenant since the contractual rights of the Indenture were not
violated); Cincinnati SMSA Ltd. P’ship v. Cincinnati Bell Cellular Sys. Co., 708 A.3d 989, 992
(Del. 1998) (determining a bondholder must show from express terms that particular implied term
would have been included if parties had negotiated for it).
76
77
78
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approach makes life simple and predictable for courts and comports with the
courts’ general approach to interpreting financial instruments.81
The leading case taking this approach in connection with a debt
restructuring is Katz v. Oak Industries,82 in which Delaware Chancellor
William T. Allen rejected a good faith challenge to an exit consent attached
to an exchange offer and directed to lifting business covenants. The device
violated no express terms of the contract.83 Its coercive character was
acknowledged, but not found to traverse any applicable norm—the
bondholders were deemed to have a free choice between participating and
holding out.84 Nor did the Chancellor see any problem with the issuer taking
actions to benefit shareholders at the expense of creditors—that, after all, is
what directors are supposed to do.85
Chancellor Allen also is responsible for the leading decision on bondholder
vote-buying, Kass v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.86 This case concerned a thirty-fivedollar-per-bond payment in exchange for a consent to waive a dividend
covenant.87 The plaintiff, invoking a general public policy against vote-buying,
claimed a breach of the good faith duty stemming from the fact that the payment
went only to consenting bondholders rather than going to the group on an equal
basis.88 Chancellor Allen rejected the argument, seeing no reason to doubt that
the payments lay within the expectations of the parties to the contract.89
D. Commentary
A comparison of Part I’s efficiency analysis and this Part’s sketch of the
regulatory framework raises two questions. First, why do we have this
incomplete, patchwork response to the distortion problem? Second, why is
81 The Rule of Explicitness, which “prevents a senior lienholder from obtaining post-petition
interest under a subordination . . . agreement unless there is language in the agreement that is
‘precise, explicit, and unambiguous,’” is one mechanism bankruptcy courts utilize to ensure parties
have predictability in the interpretation of their financial agreements. John C. Murray, Enforceability
of Intercreditor Agreements in Bankruptcy, 19 PRAC. REAL EST. L. 27, 29 (2003).
82 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986).
83 Id. at 881.
84 Id. at 881-82.
85 Id. at 879.
86 1986 WL 13008 (Del. Ch. Nov. 14, 1986), aff ’d, 518 A.2d. 983 (Del. 1986); see also Drage v.
Santa Fe Pac. Corp., 1995 WL 396370 (Ohio Ct. App. July 3, 1995). Corporate law’s anti-vote buying
prohibition does not carry over to senior securities. New York, for example, relaxes a statutory
prohibition against vote-buying to permit the votes of preferred stockholders to be bought, provided
the offer to purchase is made to all holders and left open for twenty days. N.Y. BUS. CORP. L.
§ 609(e) (LexisNexis 1963). The same would seem to follow for bonds, which in any event lie outside
the corporate law pale.
87 Kass, 1986 WL 13008 at *1.
88 Id.
89 Id. at *4-5.
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there a treatment differential between stockholders and bondholders?
Stockholders enjoy full application of the Williams Act and a prohibition
against vote-for-cash trading, and minority shareholders enjoy special
anticoercion rules that go beyond those imposed by the Williams Act.
Bondholders get none of these benefits. This section suggests some answers
to these two questions.
Note, first, that there is an across-the-board reluctance to imply protective,
common law duties to assure undistorted consent-giving. The big statutory
interventions—the TIA and the Williams Act—are the legislative results of
moments in history in which their respective subject matters emerged as frontline policy concerns. In both cases, bright-line federal mandates supplemented
the base of state law without influencing its normative coloration.
At the same time, the logic of Part I’s efficiency account has not filtered
into state law’s normative framework. Without this policy baseline, there is
little on which case law might build. Self-interested voting raises no hackles,
absent a contrary duty on the voter’s part. Were it otherwise, there would be
a difficult problem of sorting proper from improper self-interested
motivation. No theory presents itself other than Part I’s efficiency analysis,
which signals a regime of sincere voting, an ideal result difficult to realize in
the real world due to problems of verification. Unless a given voter has a duty
to disclose, there may be no way to ascertain his or her motivations. The
prohibition of votes-for-cash applied to common stock emerges more as an
exception to the rule than as a normative base point susceptible to expansion.
Coercive setups are easier to identify than voter self-interest. But, absent
an independent duty not to coerce, it once again is difficult to formulate a
norm that draws a line between the proper and the improper. The efficiency
analysis again provides no help in drawing the line. It signals that both tender
and exchange offers should be banned outright, a result that makes no sense
either as regards stock, as to which cash tender offers play an agency cost
reductive role, or bonds, as to which the TIA makes the exchange offer the
sole mode for out-of-court restructuring. When a court is asked to intervene
against a coercive exit consent, nothing precludes the possibility that doing
so would inhibit the closing of a beneficial deal. As we saw in Part I, coercion
is not objectionable per se in practice, and can have a useful instrumental
aspect when holdouts are present.
Such intervention is duty driven, and contract law offers very little with
which to fill the gap. This is not only a function of the ad hoc barriers
developed in the case law to application of the good faith duty in financial
contexts. There also are structural impediments. Coercion per se invalidates
a contract only if it amounts to duress, which presupposes an improper threat
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and no reasonable alternative,90 extreme conditions not present in bond
workouts. Coercive tactics and hard bargaining do figure into unconscionability
avoidance.91 But, with the exception of one outlier case from a half century
ago that invoked the interest of helpless mom-and-pop bondholders in
invalidating a bond contract term as adhesive,92 the bundle of notions bound
up in unconscionability have no traction in this big money context. Finally,
the TIA itself defuses any sense of fact-driven urgency. As Congress has
already intervened here to ensure protection, no further exertion in the form
of an implied contractual duty is required.
Bankruptcy law provides an instructive contrast. Though bankruptcy is an
equitably driven process explicitly devoted to creditor protection, it does
relatively little regarding self-interested voting and coercive kickers. Under
Chapter 11, (1) a reorganization plan’s proponent must be in good faith93 and
(2) the votes of creditors that are not solicited or cast in good faith may be
designated by the court (that is, cast as the court sees fit).94 There is little case
law interpreting these mandates, and neither provision has been read
expansively. Thus, claimants protesting coercive “death trap” reorganization
plans that penalize nonconsenting creditors have succeeded in invalidating
them for failure to meet the “fair and equitable standard,”95 but not as bad
faith coercion.96 The ban on bad-faith voting applies only when a creditor casts
its vote not to maximize the return on its claim, but rather to increase the value
of other investments;97 or when a creditor has engaged in “obstructive tactics
. . . [and] hold-up techniques” to exact better treatment for its individual
claim, rather than for all similarly situated creditors with claims in the same

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 175(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Credible Coercion, 85 TEX. L. REV. 717, 757-58 (2005).
Van Gemert v. Boeing, 520 F.2d 1373 (2d Cir. 1975).
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (2012).
11 U.S.C. § 1126(e) (2012).
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2012).
Compare In re MCorp Fin. Inc. 137 B.R. 219, 236 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1992) (holding that a
death trap provision violated the “fair and equitable” requirement for cramdown plans) and In re
Allegheny Int’l, Inc., 118 B.R. 282, 304 n.15 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990) (finding that a death trap
provision was not fair and equitable because it discriminated against classes of creditors who voted
against the plan), with In re Zenith Elecs. Corp., 241 B.R. 92, 105-06 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999) (holding
a death trap plan permissible if it does not violate “fair and equitable” requirement) and In re Drexel
Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc., 138 B.R. 714, 715 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (approving death trap plan),
aff ’d, 140 B.R. 346 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
97 H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 411 (1977) (explaining that section 1126(e) is intended to overturn
Aladdin Hotel Co. v. Bloom, in which the majority bondholders voted for an amendment because of
the benefit to their equity interest in the debtor firm).
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
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class.98 Merely amassing a blocking position for the purposes of preventing
plan confirmation will not, by itself, result in designation.99
We note that a court inclined to take self-interested voting or bond issuer
coercion seriously could break with the foregoing pattern by making two
moves. First, process would be distinguished from substance. In the leading
bondholder good faith cases, the plaintiffs sought added substantive rights,
and the courts refused, hesitating to disturb settled allocations of risk and
return. Objections to workouts ask for considerably less in the way of
intervention, going not to the risk-return allocation but to the bargaining
framework for its modification. As such, a good faith claim falls into territory
already problematized in contract law, which admits substantive review of
modifications of executory contracts.100 Second, the court would intervene
discretely so as to conform to the pattern of exception by rule. A different
result in Katz called only for a rule against exit consents. Kass asked only for
a cash-for-votes ban like that already in place for common stock.101
Unfortunately, there is a powerful policy reason to refrain from such a
process-based application of the good faith duty to bond workouts. Workouts
already are hard to do because TIA section 316(b) blocks majoritarian
amendment of payment terms; courts do not want to make things even
harder. Exchange offers are seen as likely to fail because they prompt holding
out. In order to minimize the holdout problem, issuers attach high minimum
tender conditions to the offer, which make success less likely. When an issuer
also resorts to coercive exit consents and consent payments, it is in effect
retaliating against holdouts in the service of a deal that just might make
everyone better off. A different result in Katz, prohibiting exit consents,
would make workouts still harder to do, implying cognizable opportunity
costs. The same goes for vote-buying. Return to the consent payment
sanctioned in Kass, which concerned an amendment that relaxed a business
covenant.102 Going concern modifications like these succeed without cash
consideration only given cooperatively disposed lenders. “Relational” lenders,
such as banks in syndicated loans and insurance companies in classic private

98 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1126.06[2] (16th ed. 2011); see also Young v. Higbee Co., 324
U.S. 204, 213 (1945) (“[Creditors] cannot avail themselves of the statutory privilege of litigating for
the interest of a class and then shake off their self-assumed responsibilities to others by a simple
announcement that henceforth they will trade in the rights of others for their own aggrandizement.”).
99 See Figter Ltd. v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of Am., 118 F.3d 635, 639 (9th Cir. 1997)
(stressing that “the mere fact that a creditor has purchased additional claims for the purpose of
protecting his own existing claim does not demonstrate bad faith or an ulterior motive”).
100 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 89(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (calling
for changed circumstances and fairness review).
101 Kass v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 1986 WL 13008, at *3 (Del. Ch. Nov. 14, 1986).
102 Id. at *1.
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placements, have the requisite cooperative incentives,103 which bondholders
do not. Payment is expected when bond issuers seek waivers. Vote-buying,
although suspicious when considered in the abstract, imports useful flexibility
in this arm’s length context.
This policy case against judicial intervention to inhibit issuer coercion
stems from a generally accepted picture of uncooperative bondholders and
dysfunctional exchange offers, a picture that in turn informs a longstanding
policy case for repeal of section 316(b). Part III shows that the practice picture
has changed in recent years. Today, exchange offers tend to succeed, so the
case for judicial intervention looks different.
III. THE NEW RESTRUCTURING
Professor Mark Roe initiated a policy case against section 316(b) in an
article published in 1987.104 Roe saw section 316(b) as a source of avoidable
costs. Workout by exchange offer was just too hard to do. Uncertainty and
opportunism were combining to prevent value-enhancing exchange offers
from closing where direct amendment would have succeeded, causing the
agency costs of debt and the cost of bankruptcy to run to excess.105
Bondholders who might otherwise support a deal of uncertain value withheld
consent because they did not wish to be victimized by free-riding holdouts.106
Exit consents ameliorated the holdout problem without solving it.107
Professor Victor Brudney countered a few years later, arguing for the
status quo from what amounted to a polar opposite position. Like Roe, he
assumed that holdouts tend to cause exchange to fail, but drew very different
policy inferences.108 Brudney insisted on a process platform offering
undistorted choice and found that all proposals for majoritarian amendment
came up short under that standard.109 Meanwhile, the contracting platform

103 See generally William W. Bratton, Bond and Loan Covenants, Theory and Practice, 11 CAP.
MKTS. L.J. 461, 477-81 (2016) (“Bank loans and private placements tend to involve a small number
of lenders able to coordinate renegotiation of the contract terms with the borrower in the event of a
covenant default. Indeed, renegotiation is expected.”).
104 See Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L.J. 232, 263 (1987) (“As
a protective measure, section 316 is incomplete.”).
105 Id. at 243.
106 Id. at 239.
107 Roe argues (1) that many bonds are without significant covenants to strip away, (2) that exit
consents are a factor only in a debt exchange and not in a deal involving cash or stock, and (3) that
the courts might eventually suppress them. See id. at 250, 256 (noting that majoritarian amendment
of payment terms no longer impaired negotiability).
108 See Brudney, supra note 13, at 1877 (“[R]ules could be fashioned to encourage, or even require, public
bondholders to organize so that they might deal with the debtor in the same way as a sole lender would.”).
109 See id. at 1828 (evaluating the costs and benefits of strategic behavior).
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was tilted against the bondholders,110 who labored under a collective action
problem and had no opportunity to negotiate with issuers over what
amounted to a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Issuers behaved strategically, timing
their offers to suit their own agendas. Information asymmetries were intrinsic
and irremediable.111 Brudney also challenged the notion that restructuring
failure necessarily triggers excess bankruptcy costs, asserting that in many
cases the issuer was deteriorating so severely as to land in Chapter 11 even in
the event of a successful workout.112 Exchange offers had no significant cost
reductive effect in such cases, and simply served to weaken the rights of those
classes making concessions.113
Roe, Brudney, and subsequent participants in this discussion work from a
common bundle of assumptions. In the generally accepted picture, section
316(b) makes out-of-court restructuring dysfunctional by foreclosing direct
majority amendment of payment terms. Exchange offers come with 80% to
90% minimum tender conditions because bondholders insist that the holdout
possibilities be minimized.114 This makes the offers likely to fail, prompting
issuers to respond with coercive ploys like exit consents. Even so, failure is
likely. It is a lose-lose outcome, with bankruptcy following and a surfeit of
additional costs that make everyone worse off. With direct amendment by a
two-thirds or three-quarters majority, none of this would happen.
This Part shows that the practice has changed materially in recent years.
First, bankruptcy itself has become cheaper with the proliferation of
prepackaged, or “prepac,” bankruptcy during the 1990s and the shift to
creditor control after the turn of the century. Second, and more importantly,
out-of-court restructuring activity has increased markedly during the past
decade. Moreover, restructurings now tend to succeed—holdouts are much
less of a problem. Today’s exchange offers are negotiated deals—the take-itor-leave-it ad in the paper has disappeared. At the same time, issuer coercion
is more salient than ever. Where formerly it was merely common, now it is
ubiquitous. We call these “the new workouts.”
Section A reconstructs the old picture of workouts, drawing on financial
economic studies of datasets dating from before 2008. The studies provide
support for both the Roe and Brudney positions, variously showing a high
failure rate, issuer coercion, and holdout behavior but also detailing a long list
of business reasons why a well-informed, uncoerced, and sincere bondholder
might refuse to tender.

110
111
112
113
114

Id. at 1832-34.
Id. at 1853-54.
Id. at 1862-63.
Id. at 1860.
See Roe, supra note 104, at 236–37 n.11.
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Section B considers comparative costs. It shows that workouts are, indeed,
the cheaper mode of proceeding, but explains that, quite apart from the section
316(b) barrier, circumstances often close off the out-of-court route. Discussion
then turns to the cost of bankruptcy, detailing the proliferation of prepacs and a
more recent trend toward faster, cheaper disposition in regular bankruptcies. The
negative cost implications of a failed restructuring have dropped substantially.
Section C looks at workout volume. The uptick in out-of-court activity
began as the result of an external shock, when financing sources dried up in
2008, but the change in the pattern has persisted. The shift occurred in the
teeth of predictions that workouts would disappear altogether due to the
proliferation of credit default swap protection, the purchasers of which have
everything to gain from a bankruptcy filing.
We then turn, in Section D, to contemporary restructuring practice. We
draw on a hand-collected data set of exchange offers made by SEC reporting
companies from 2011 to 2016 to show that most workouts close. None of this
goes to say that there are no holdouts or that holdouts no longer complicate
matters. It just recharacterizes them as a secondary concern to issuer coercion.
Section E pursues parallel explanations for the change, narrow and broad.
The narrow explanation concerns the federal securities laws: a shift in the
basis for the exchange offers’ exemption from section 3(a)(9) of the Securities
Act of 1933 (‘33 Act) to the Rule 144A exemption under the 1934 Act makes
the field more receptive to negotiation. The broad explanation concerns the
interplay between restructuring out of court and in bankruptcy. Previously, a
bright line separated the alternatives. The choice between the two lay in the
debtor, and debtor discretion was the rule, even inside Chapter 11. Now,
secured creditors tend to call the shots inside bankruptcy. These creditors also
loom large in out-of-court negotiations. The result is a graying of the line
between in and out of court, with process choices emerging as incidents of a
single, overall negotiating process.
A. The Dysfunctional Workout
There is considerable support for the assertion that workouts are
dysfunctional. The empirical literature shows that restructurings tend to fail, with
holdouts figuring prominently in the account. It also shows that bondholder
opportunism prompts issuer coercion, which in turn enhances the chance of
success. But the downward spiral of opportunism and coercion is not the only
salient factor. Business fundamentals also figure prominently when workouts fail.
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The studies, which cover the 1980s and 1990s, tend to show that half or
less of attempted exchange offers succeeded,115 although depending on the set
of deals examined, success rates varied from 27%,116 to as high as 75%.117 Putting
aside the 75% outlier, the failure rate implies that holdouts, taken together with
ancillary creditor coordination problems, impose an opportunity cost.118 But it
does so without foreclosing other, business-based explanations.
1. Holdouts
The studies attempt to confirm a causal connection between holdouts and
deal failure indirectly, by establishing a causal connection between the
holdout threat and the exit consent. The studies proceed from the premise
that a coercive device with the purpose and effect of targeting holdouts is
arguably justified, whereas a coercive device with the purpose and effect of
cramming down a bad transaction is not. The studies compare offers made
with exit consents to offers made without. Each study contains a different
respective percentage of offers that include exit consents, 28%,119 56%,120 or
33%121 of the offers include exit consents. The studies show, intuitively, that exit
consents increase the number of tenders and the success rate.122 They compare

115 See Julian R. Franks & Walter N. Torous, A Comparison of Financial Recontracting in Distressed
Exchanges and Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 35 J. FIN. ECON. 349, 351 (1994) (tracking 161 distressed
firms from 1983–1988 and finding that 76 restructured out of court and 78 went into bankruptcy);
Stuart C. Gilson, Kose John & Larry H.P. Lang, Troubled Debt Restructurings: An Empirical Study of
Private Reorganization of Firms in Default, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 315, 328 (1990) (studying distressed
exchange offers from 1978–1987 and finding that 52.7% of the firms went into bankruptcy); Lewis S.
Peterson, Who’s Being Greedy? A Theoretical Examination of Holdouts and Coercion in Debt Tender and
Exchange Offers, 103 YALE L.J. 505, 506 (1993) (citing a distressed sample from 1990–1992, of which
50% of the total debt volume was restructured out of court). Salomon Brothers kept running totals,
showing one-half or less completed on an annual basis, 1991-93. See Peterson, supra note 115, at 506 n.6.
116 See Sris Chatterjee, Upinder S. Dhillon & Gabriel G. Ramirez, Coercive Tender and
Exchange Offers in Distressed High-Yield Debt Restructurings: An Empirical Analysis, 38 J. FIN. ECON.
333, 339-40 (1995) (studying 46 exchange announcements by 40 firms, from 1989–1992).
117 See Christopher James, Bank Debt Restructurings and the Composition of Exchange Offers in
Financial Distress, 51 J. FIN. 711, 716-18 (1996) (studying 68 proposed exchange offers from 1980–1990).
118 See Edith S. Hotchkiss, Kose John, Robert M. Mooradian & Karin S. Thorburn, Bankruptcy
and the Resolution of Financial Distress, in 2 HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE FINANCE: EMPIRICAL
CORPORATE FINANCE 253 (B. Espen Eckbo ed., 2008) (“The general conclusion from much of this
literature is that absent holdout problems and other coordination problems, private debt restructurings
such as exchange offers provide a lower cost restructuring mechanism than formal bankruptcy.”).
119 Peterson, supra note 115, at 526.
120 See Kenneth Daniels & Gabriel G. Ramírez, Debt Restructurings, Holdouts, and Exit Consents,
3 J. FIN. STABILITY 1, 2 (2007) (analyzing a sample of exchange and tender offers).
121 Chatterjee et al., supra note 116, at 339.
122 See id. at 349; (noting the effect of coercion on the increased number of tenders); Peterson,
supra note 115, at 526 (noting that 65% of offers with exit consent offers close while 59% of offers
without consent offers close).
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the two sets of offers on the assumption that exit consents will tend to show up
where holdouts are more of a problem, using proxies to indicate holdouts.123
2. Business Frictions
A bondholder considering whether to accept an exchange offer worries
about more than strategic holdouts. Some offers are bad on their own. A good
offer meets two conditions. First, it cuts deeply enough into the bondholders’
contract rights to yield a sustainable capital structure,124 and, second, it must not
cut so deeply as to allocate to the common stockholders too much of the surplus
arising from the achievement of sustainability. Threading this needle is not easy.
As Brudney points out, a workout can make the bondholders worse off if
the issuer limps into bankruptcy anyway, for the old bond would entail a
bankruptcy claim in the original face amount. Bond analysts cite postexchange bankruptcy as a significant risk factor for bondholders taking
exchanges. The studies confirm that creditors are less likely to support
proposals as distress becomes more severe.125 Yet, according to the studies,
bankruptcy eventually happens about half of the time even when the offer
succeeds—depending on the study, in 52%,126 59%,127 or 46%128 of the cases.
And, as Brudney also notes, the bankruptcy rate implies a need to make a
corresponding adjustment to the back-of-the-envelope estimate of the
deadweight costs of failed workouts, for bankruptcy costs are not opportunity
123 See Chatterjee et al., supra note 116, at 346-47 (associating senior debt with exit consents);
Daniels & Ramírez, supra note 120, at 8 (associating exit consents with larger and riskier issuers).
The studies are marred by over inclusion because they include cash tender offers as well as exchange
offers. See, e.g., Chatterjee et al., supra note 116, at 343 (noting that the type of debt targeted, the
type of a firm’s financial claims, and the type of securities offered in the workout influence the
severity of holdouts); Daniels & Ramírez, supra note 120, at 10, 15 (reasoning that exit consents are
sought when holdout issues are not mitigated by offering bondholders more senior claims);
Peterson, supra note 115, at 525 (describing the relationship among holdouts, non-consent tender
offers, and exchange offers). Unsurprisingly, cash tender offers succeed more often. See id. (“We can
determine the frequency of holdout problems by examining the values of non-tendered debt before
and after non-consent tender and exchange offers”).
124 Patrick McGeever, An Introduction to Distressed Debt Exchanges, AAM (Feb. 18, 2016),
http://www.aamcompany.com/insight/an-introduction-to-distressed-debt-exchanges/
[https://perma.cc/XNQ5-CWLQ] (noting that the threatened increase in distressed debt exchanges
has resulted in fewer “investors willing to buy unsecured debt given the lack of confidence in the
future capital structure of the investment.”).
125 Hotchkiss et al., supra note 118, at 252 (“The fact that senior creditors are willing to give up
a greater fraction of the firm to junior claimants in a workout suggests that on average firms
attempting workouts may be less severely financially insolvent than bankrupt firms.”).
126 Chatterjee et al., supra note 116, at 352.
127 Paul Asquith, Robert Gertner & David Scharfstein, Anatomy of Financial Distress: An
Examination of Junk-Bond Issuers, 109 Q.J. ECON. 625, 640 (1994).
128 Edward I. Altman & Brenda Karlin, The Re-Emergence of Distressed Exchanges in Corporate
Restructurings, 5 J. CREDIT RISK 43, 51 (2009).
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costs to the extent they were going to be incurred in all events.129 Instead, the
only issue is the time differential of when those costs are incurred.
Other business factors also figure into the causation picture. Assets
matter—it has been found that a workout is more likely to succeed if a firm’s
assets are intangible because the value of intangibles tends to erode in
bankruptcy.130 Capital structure complexity also merits attention. The smaller
the number of classes of creditors, the more likely a successful
restructuring.131 Financial creditors are not the only pertinent players—a
large and uncooperative population of trade creditors can force a company
into bankruptcy.132 The presence of a large bank lender also makes a
difference, but the particular effect depends on the case.133
B. Workouts Versus Bankruptcy: Comparative Costs
We now turn to a cost comparison between out-of-court restructuring and
bankruptcy. This confirms the point that constraints on the out-of-court route
imply opportunity costs, but also shows that the cost differential has decreased
substantially since Professor Roe problematized section 316(b) in 1987.
Exchange offers, when they do work, yield better cost numbers than do
bankruptcies. Bondholder recovery rates are higher in out-of-court
restructurings.134 The deals close relatively quickly and without much
129 This was Brudney’s point. Note that additional factors will come to bear on the resulting
deduction from the opportunity cost ledger. Consider the following possibility: maybe management
put a low-ball haircut into the offer due to fear of holdouts; had management been free to set the
haircut at the level needed for a sustainable capital structure, Chapter 11 could have been avoided.
130 See Gilson et al., supra note 115, at 316 (“Financial distress is more likely to be resolved
through private renegotiation when more of the firm’s assets are intangible.”).
131 See id. at 322 (discussing factors that make a restructuring feasible).
132 See Chatterjee et al., supra note 116, at 343 (noting that firms with heterogeneous claimants
must deal with wider disagreement and are therefore harder to restructure).
133 Banks tend to be secured, and a fully secured lender has little to fear regarding impairment
of its interest in bankruptcy and so will be disinclined to make concessions outside of bankruptcy.
See James, supra note 117, at 712 (noting that banks tend to only make concessions when firms are in
severe financial distress). At the same time, under-secured banks are more likely to make concessions
out of court precisely because their recovery in a foreclosure—the alternative to concessions—would
be limited. When an under-secured bank is willing to negotiate, the bank’s negotiation facilitates a
parallel bondholder workout. See id. (finding that exchanges accompanied by bank concessions entail
larger haircuts and junior claims, and are more likely to succeed). Banks tend to make larger
investments in information retrieval, so bank participation also imports a reduction in information
asymmetry which is facilitative. See Hotchkiss et al., supra note 118, at 250 (“[B]ecause banks are
better informed than public debtholders, reducing potential information asymmetries, it is easier
for firms with banks as dominant creditors to renegotiate their debt.”).
134 See Altman & Karlin, supra note 128, at 50 tbl.2 (showing an average recovery rate, 1984–
2009, on exchanges of 50.8 cents on the dollar for out-of-court restructurings compared to 37.5 cents
on the dollar for other defaults); see also Hotchkiss et al., supra note 118, at 269 (noting that
restructured firms are still typically highly leveraged after Chapter 11 as compared to firms that
complete out-of-court restructurings).
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additional cost. One study averages the cost of an exchange offer at 0.6% of
pre-exchange asset book value, another at 2.5%.135 In contrast, results of major
studies of the direct costs of bankruptcy average out at 6.5% of book value.136
Indirect costs of bankruptcy, while difficult to measure, are thought to be
higher still, at 10% or more.137 A caveat still should be noted. Indirect cost
incurrence tends to be concentrated during the period after distress sets in,
but prior to bankruptcy.138 It follows that some of these costs also befall
distressed firms that succeed in closing a workout.
Even with the caveat, the cost and recovery numbers suggest that
workouts would predominate over bankruptcies in a perfect world. Real world
frictions prevent that, quite apart from bargaining instability and regulatory
constraints. If the debtor’s problems are due to tort, tax, trade debt, or a
complicated capital structure, then exchanges have little to offer. Moreover,
if the debtor lacks a viable business model, a liquidation makes more sense
than a restructuring, so there is no point to an exchange. Chapter 11 then
offers a high-octane federal sales power that facilitates liquidation.139 Severe
liquidity problems also can make bankruptcy the only alternative.140 Finally,
bankruptcy has special advantages for some companies, like disaffirmance of
onerous contracts,141 and the nationwide service of process.142
Managers may balk at the suggestion of an early exchange offer because
an exchange offer takes a distressed but non-defaulting company across the
line to default in the eyes of the credit rating agencies.143 An exchange offer
announcement tends to prompt a drop in the price of the company’s
common stock, even though economic theory holds that the offeror is trying
to unlock a surplus.144 Apparently, the offer by itself imports negative
informational content. The bonds themselves also are likely to lose value in
the wake of an announcement,145 even as they can be expected to increase
in value if the offer succeeds.146 There is also a negative tax result at some
Altman & Karlin, supra note 128, at 29.
Id. at 44.
Id. at 48.
Id. at 49.
See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2012) (allowing the trustee to sell a property free and clear during
bankruptcy if certain conditions are met).
140 Hotchkiss et. al., supra note 118, at 250.
141 11 U.S.C. §§ 365, 1110, 1113, 1114 (2012).
142 FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004.
143 Albeit in a separate subcategory. McGeever, supra note 124.
144 See Chatterjee et al., supra note 116, at 352 (showing a negative announcement period return
of -3.28%); Gilson et al., supra note 115, at 342 (reporting a return of -1.6% for firms whose exchange
offers succeed and -6.3% for firms whose offers go on to fail).
145 See Chatterjee et al., supra note 116, at 17 (showing an announcement negative return of
0.98% for private workouts and -0.54% for public workouts).
146 Peterson, supra note 115, at 528-30.
135
136
137
138
139
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companies: the difference between the face value of the old bond and the
principal amount for which it is exchanged amounts to cancellation of
indebtedness income.147
Meanwhile, bankruptcy has gotten cheaper, reducing the policy stakes
surrounding section 316(b). Prepac bankruptcy processes,148 which have
proliferated during the past quarter century, ask the court to confirm the
amount in a workout approved by at least two-thirds of the amount and over
one-half of the number of each impaired class of creditors. The entire prepac
process can, in theory, result in plan confirmation in twenty-eight days and a
plan going effective in forty-two days.149 Prepacs are more expensive and time
consuming than workouts, but not by all that much. Studies variously find
average (median) direct costs of prepacs at 2.8% (2.4%)150 and 1.8% (1.4%)151 of
prebankruptcy assets, putting them between workouts and full-dress
bankruptcies on the cost scale, but much closer to workouts. Prepacs, while
slightly more expensive, also offer powers not available in workouts: amendment
of core payment terms based on majority consent; redemption of nonredeemable
debt; cure and reinstatement of accelerated debts without creditor consent; the
ability to get new, superpriority financing; and the asset sale power.

147 I.R.C. § 108 (West 2018). To the extent that the company has taxable income and lacks loss
carryovers to offset it, this tax tab has a cognizable downside. See Altman & Karlin, supra note 128,
at 44. The downside is exacerbated by the fact that the same haircut, if effected in Chapter 11, creates
no taxable income. I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(a) (West 2018).
148 Chapter 11 debtors are generally prohibited from soliciting consents on a Chapter 11 plan
prior to the court approving a plan disclosure statement. There is an important exception to this
rule, however: if the consents are solicited prior to the filing for bankruptcy, then no disclosure
statement is required. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1125(b), 1125(g), 1126(b) (2012). This facilitates a much faster
bankruptcy process in two ways. First, the plan can be filed with the bankruptcy petition, enabling
a plan confirmation hearing in as little as twenty-eight days. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(b), 3020(b)(2).
Second, because there is no requirement of a court-approved disclosure statement, there is less
ability for dissident creditors to hold up the process. The solicitation of votes on a prepac must still
comply with any relevant nonbankruptcy law, such as federal or state securities laws, but these
disclosure regimes only create ex post liability. In contrast, bankruptcy has a merits-based disclosure
regime that allows for the injunction of the dissemination of a disclosure statement that has not been
preapproved by the court, which in turn enables holdup objections. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b), (g) (2012).
149 Faster timetables have been approved in court. See e.g., Andriana Georgallas, Chapter 22
Commencement to Confirmation in Just 6 Days: Exploring Roust Corporation, WEIL BANKRUPTCY BLOG,
https://business-finance-restructuring.weil.com/plan-solicitation-and-voting/chapter-22-commencementto-confirmation-in-just-6-days-exploring-roust-corporation/ [https://perma.cc/U54E-SXEX] (discussing
the recent trend of quick confirmation of prepacking plans, including In re Roust Corp., which was
approved in six days, and In re Blue Bird Body Co., which was confirmed within 24 hours).
150 Brian L. Betker, The Administrative Costs of Debt Restructurings: Some Recent Evidence, 26
FIN. MGMT. 56, 62 (1997).
151 Elizabeth Tashjian, Ronald C. Lease & John J. McConnell, Prepacks: An Empirical Analysis
of Prepackaged Bankruptcies, 40 J. FIN. ECON. 135, 143 (1996).
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Time is an important factor—cost goes up as debtors linger in Chapter
11.152 Classic studies from before the turn of this century put the average
duration of a bankruptcy reorganization proceeding at 2.5 years,153 2.3 years,154
and 2.2 years.155 But the most recent set of numbers, covering 1981 to 2013,
shows a notable reduction to a median of 1.04 years. Prepacs, which are much
quicker, have a lot to do with this, averaging 0.34 years over the same period,
while regular bankruptcies take an average of 1.53 years.156 In 1990, prepacs made
up 3.3% of public company bankruptcy filings; in 2012, they made up 33.3%.157
Regular bankruptcies, taken by themselves, have also gotten faster. Since
2000, performance terms attached to debtor-in-possession financing
agreements (DIP loans) shifted power from the debtor’s managers to its
creditors.158 Where once debtors made endless motions for extensions of plan
exclusivity, there are now frequently timetables for asset sales or plan
confirmation and other performance metrics.159 We also have more
dispositions by sale of going concern assets as compared to conventional
reorganization by renegotiated capital structure.160 In 1990, the average nonprepac took 2.21 years, a duration that shortened to 0.71 years for the class of
2012.161 As yet, no exhaustive new study of bankruptcy costs covers these
recent years. We predict that when such a study is conducted, it will show a
continued substantial reduction.
We note one further factor: debt contracting has itself evolved so as to
reduce the risk of default. The debt incurred during the private equity wave
of 2003–2007 came to maturity without a hint of an insolvency crisis. The
152 Hotchkiss et al., supra note 118, at 262.
153 Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of Claims, in
CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 260, 263 (Jagdeep S.

Bhandari & Lawrence A. Weiss eds., 1996)
154 Arturo Bris, Ivo Welch & Ning Zhu, The Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 Liquidation versus
Chapter 11 Reorganization, 61 J. FIN. 1253, 1272 (2006).
155 See Franks & Torous, supra note 115, at 354 (showing that average Chapter 11
reorganization took twenty-seven months).
156 Edward I. Altman & Brenda J. Kuehne, Defaults and Returns in the High-Yield Bond and
Distressed Debt Market: Review and Outlook, in CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES IN RISK
MANAGEMENT: DEALING WITH RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND THE UNKNOWN 203, 212 (T.
Andersen & Stanley Mayes eds., 2014).
157 Edward I. Altman, The Role of Distressed Debt Markets, Hedge Funds and Recent Trends in
Bankruptcy on the Outcomes of Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 75, 92 fig.7
(2014). The prepac percentage varies widely. In this century, the low was 3.4% (2001) and the high
was 76.9% (2013). The average since 1988 is 11.6%. Id.
158 Altman & Karlin, supra note 128, at 52.
159 Since late 2005, debtors also face a hard cap on the period in which they have the exclusive
right to propose a plan. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109–8, § 411 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d)) (prohibiting extensions of the period in
which parties can file plans).
160 See infra text accompanying note 194.
161 Altman, supra note 157, at 92 fig.7.
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terms of the deals had something to do with this—many omit financial
covenants and contain “pay-in-kind” (PIK) interest terms allowing distressed
managers to postpone cash payments.162 Efficiency enhancements in Chapter
11 practice also surely played a role. But, contrary to expectations, out-ofcourt restructurings also figured in.
C. The Shift to Workouts
1. Volume
Restructuring practice shifted abruptly in 2008 due to a temporary absence
of financing. It is impossible to reorganize a firm in Chapter 11 without
adequate financing for ongoing operations. This financing comes from DIP
loans, but the DIP lending market contracted drastically during the credit
crunch of 2008—precisely at the moment when demand for financing spiked.
Without a viable bankruptcy option, distressed borrowers turned to
exchange offers.163 The number of distressed exchanges effected in 2008 was
double that of any year since 1984, the first year when data are available, and
the total amount exchanged ($30.3 billion) exceeded twice the total amount
exchanged in all years from 1984–2007.164 The implicated debt issues
comprised 59% of issues in default at the time, compared with 10% of issues
in default from 1984–2007.165 Although DIP financing only disappeared
temporarily, the percentage of workouts remained large in 2009 and 2010, at
18.5% and 36%, respectively.166 For these two years there was a tax
explanation—a temporary deferral of taxation of cancellation of indebtedness
income until 2014.167 The tax deferral ended after 2010, and in 2011 exchange
defaults constituted a more normal 9.5% of total defaults.168 In 2012 and 2013,
however, the number of restructuring exchange offers picked up again to 21%
of issues.169 Overall, debt exchanges made up 29% of all issuer defaults during
2008–2013, compared to 10% for 1984–2007.170
Chapter 11’s continued dominance is not surprising. As we have noted,
restructuring by exchange makes sense for only a subset of debtors. We are
162 See Bratton, supra note 103, at 479 (“Cov[enant]-lite loans resemble junk bonds, containing
restrictive covenants but no maintenance tests.”).
163 Altman & Karlin, supra note 128, at 46 (describing the “resurgence in the incidence
of distressed exchanges”).
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Altman & Kuehne, supra note 156, at 226 tbl.8.7.
167 See I.R.C. § 108(i)(1)(A)-(B) (West 2018) (describing qualification for deferral and ratable
inclusion of business indebtedness income).
168 Altman & Kuehne, supra note 156, at 226.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 225; Altman & Karlin, supra note 128, at 46.
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not able to say what percentage of debtors would meet this description. The
point is merely that, with around one-fifth of all defaulting public company
debtors turning to exchanges and only a subset of the group well-suited to
the exchange alternative in the first place, workouts now vie with bankruptcy
as a restructuring option within the subset. This is an important change.
2. The Empty Creditor Problem
The workout uptick is doubly surprising in view of a lengthening list of
inhibiting frictions. A so-called “empty creditor” problem has spilled over
from the proliferation of credit default swaps (CDSs).171 In a CDS, a
protection seller promises to pay a protection buyer a certain sum in the event
of a defined credit event on a reference asset in exchange for a periodic fee.
When a bondholder purchases CDS protection, the CDS hedges the
bondholder’s default risk with the protection seller’s promise to pay in the
event of a default. Significantly, the International Swaps & Derivative
Association’s (ISDA) Master Agreement defines credit events to include
payment defaults and bankruptcies but not voluntary debt exchanges.172 It
follows that a bondholder with swap protection has no incentive to tender
into an exchange offer, good or bad. As between a successful restructuring
paying, say, 75 cents on the dollar, and a bankruptcy proceeding resulting in
the CDS protection seller paying 100 cents (or more 173) under the swap, the
bondholder wants the latter. It follows that, where a substantial subset of a
distressed issuer’s bondholders are paying for swap protection, an exchange
offer with a supermajority tender condition should be impossible to bring
about. In fact, an ex ante subset of protected bondholders is not even a
necessary prerequisite. Financial punters who do not hold the bonds buy
credit protection as a way of betting on a default. Once a distressed issuer
puts out an exchange offer, such a “naked” protection buyer has an incentive
to buy the bonds in order to prevent their being tendered.
So goes the story, and it makes a great deal of sense. But the supporting
evidence was entirely anecdotal until recently. This shortcoming was sharply
highlighted by a spokesman for the ISDA, which controls the standard swap
contract documentation, determines when a credit event triggering a swap

171 See Bernard Black & Henry Hu, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II:
Importance and Extensions, 156 U. P A . L. R EV . 625, 728-35 (2008) (examining and explaining
the rise of the “empty creditor problem”).
172 At least since ISDA’s “Big Bang” Protocol of 2009. See Helen Haworth, A Guide to Credit
Events and Auctions, CREDIT SUISSE 5-8 (Jan. 12, 2011) (noting that “hard credit events,” like
bankruptcy or failure to pay, trigger CDS obligations but that “[v]oluntary debt restructurings may
or may not trigger CDS contracts”).
173 The difference is amount paid under the swap plus the value of the defaulted bond.
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has occurred, and manages the process of settling up.174 The spokesman also
pointed to the upsurge in successful workouts175 as contrary evidence and set
out some arithmetic demonstrating that the naked swap arbitrage play just
hypothesized really does not work.176
A couple of empirical studies have appeared, reaching conflicting results.
One took a sample of distressed exchanges from 2006 to 2011 and compared
bondholder participation rates as between those issuers whose debt CDS
contracts had been written, and those whose debt was uncovered. The study
found a twenty-nine-point reduction in participation in the former group.177
The other study took a sample from 2008 to 2009, and found that the factors
already identified in the literature drove the results178 with no difference
resulting from the availability of swap protection.
The salience of empty creditors in distressed exchanges remains an
unresolved question. We do note that none of our empirical findings undercut
the claim that empty creditors prevent restructurings, for it is possible that
issuers and their advisors screen for them in advance, directing capital
structures with extensive CDS coverage to prepac bankruptcy. If, as seems
likely, CDS coverage does limit the class of companies suited to out-of-court
restructuring, the rise in the numbers of restructurings is doubly impressive.
D. The New Practice
The transactional profile of workouts also has changed. This Section
shows that the prevailing picture of dysfunctionality no longer holds, drawing
on hand-collected data on workouts commenced since 2010. The data show a
notable increase in flexibility and success. We also note a shift in the position
of household bondholders: now that issuers rely on the Rule 144A exemption

174 David Mengle, ISDA Research Notes: The Empty Creditor Hypothesis ISDA 1 (2009) (noting that
“the evidence available thus far, in the form of restructuring choices by distressed firms as well as in market
practices surrounding credit derivatives, does not appear favorable to the empty creditor hypothesis”).
175 Id. at 9 (arguing that “the correlation statistics” relating the number of defaults to
restructurings as a percentage of defaults “would not appear to support the empty creditor hypothesis”).
176 Id. at 10 (noting that “it is not clear, however, how an overhedging strategy might be
exploited systematically in a way that could distort credit markets or the bankruptcy process”).
177 András Danis, Do Empty Creditors Matter? Evidence from Distressed Exchange Offers 16-18
(Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Working Paper No. 1334, Apr.
24, 2013) (describing data showing that “the participation rate is on average 29.1 percentage points
lower if the issuer is a reference entity in the CDS market”).
178 Mascia Bedendo, Lara Cathcart & Lina El-Jahel, Distressed Debt Restructuring in the Presence
of Credit Default Swaps, 48 J. MONEY, CREDIT, AND BANKING 165, 167 (Feb. 2016) (“Contrary to
the empty creditor argument, we do not find evidence that companies whose bondholders might be
insured via CDSs are more likely to restructure their debt in court. In fact, the restructuring choice
is driven by essentially the same variables in both reference entities and nonreference entities.”).
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from registration, bondholders with assets under $100 million are entirely
excluded from the process.
1. New Data: Distressed Exchange Offers, 2010–2016
None of the empirical surveys of workout practice look solely at the period
since the shift of 2008. To fill this gap, we collected data from a search of
EDGAR Form 8-K files, using “exchange offer” and “indenture” as required
terms and “consent solicitation” as an optional term.179 The search covered the
period from January 1, 2010 to June 30, 2016. We narrowed the results to a
group of forty-six exchange offers made by distressed issuers.180 The offers in
the data set all entail either a reduction of principal amount, an extension of
time without an increase of interest, or a reduction of interest, and frequently
a combination of the three. We do not claim the data set to be complete. With
EDGAR as the mode of data collection, distressed issuers owned by private
equity partnerships and not reporting publicly are not included.
The terms of the workouts in the data set span a wide range of
possibilities: 50% offer new debt, 17.4% offer new debt and cash, 19.6% offer
new debt and equity (preferred or common stock), 6.5% offer new debt,
equity and cash, and 6.5% offer all equity. Within the subset offering debt
only, the new bonds extend duration in 91.3% of the cases, reduce the interest
rate in 34.8%, increase the interest rate in 47.8%, and implicate a principal
haircut in 56.5%. The average (median) proposed haircut is 43.5% (32.7%). The
average (median) number of days between the announcement of the offer and
its completion or termination is 65.4 (42). Stated as a portion of a year, the
average duration is .18, which compares favorably with prepac bankruptcy’s
average duration of .34. Workouts are almost twice as fast on average.
The new data also displace the old picture in which the holdout problem always
leads to an 80%–90% minimum tender condition that causes around one-half of the
offers to go on to fail. Our data yield a more flexible and successful picture.
Minimum tender requirements take a wide range. The 90% minimum is
the modal approach. In this sample, seventeen of forty-six offers (40%)
specify a supermajority minimum tender (90% or more in sixteen cases, 85%
in one case). In eight cases (17.4%) the minimum drops to either a simple,
two-thirds, or three-quarters, majority. One offer split the difference,
specifying 90% for a senior issue and a simple majority for junior issues.
We ran the search through the Wharton Research Data Services SEC Analytics Suite.
We excluded offers paying all cash at a premium over market price and offers that shifted
obligations to different entities within a corporate group without modifying core financial terms.
This left us with forty-four issuers. We added two issuers whose exchange offers have been the
subject of litigation—Education Management Corp. and Chesapeake Energy Corp.—and worked
the details up with press releases.
179
180
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Fifteen offers (33.3%) had no minimum tender requirement. There were an
additional five offers (10.9%) without a minimum, but as to which either a
supermajority of bondholders signed onto a formal support agreement with
the issuer or such a high subscription rate (99%) resulted as to implicate a
high level of organized support. In other words, no minimum tender
condition was needed because the necessary support already had been
secured. In the final tally, only one-half of the offers proceeded on condition
of 90% supermajority support.
Once the issuer makes the offer, things get even more flexible. Only 40%
of the offers closed with subscriptions having met a stated minimum
condition. In 17.4% of the cases, a stated minimum was waived in connection
with the closing, while 32.6% of the offers were completed with no minimum
having been stated. Extensions of time also were common, occurring in
twenty-two (47.8%) of the cases, often multiple times. Minimum tender
conditions were relaxed as the offer was extended in five cases. Only five of
the offers were sweetened.
The new data also dispel the image of failure. Overall, 87.5% of the offers
closed. Two of the closings occurred in respect of a prepac bankruptcy
solicitation run concomitantly with the out-of-court offer, where the twothirds of dollar amount tender threshold for the prepac was met but the
exchange offer’s higher threshold was not met. If those two cases are omitted
from the success column, the proportion goes down to 83%. Either way, the
success rate is higher than in the previous studies of distressed offers—only
the outlier study registering 75%181 even comes close.
There were six complete failures. They are worth a closer look.
Bankruptcy followed the offer’s failure in five of the six cases, suggesting that
the issuer was too far gone to be an appropriate company for a workout.
Indeed, in two cases, the issuers were so close to bankruptcy’s door as to make
the exchange offer a nonevent, yielding tenders of only 7.2% of the bonds in
one case (Dynegy) and only 5.1% in the other case (Colt). As to the other four
cases, the tenders came close to the minimum in only one (Angiotech), which
involved two issues with minimums of 90% and 98% and tenders of 76% and
85%, respectively. In the first of the other two cases (Penson), subscriptions
of 51% and 70% failed against a minimum of 95%; in the second (Goodrich),
62% came in against a minimum of 95%. The implication is that exchange
offers fail on the merits, rather than due to decisional instability caused by
holdouts, at least in this sample.
Increased coercion accompanies the picture of increased success. Consent
solicitations stripping covenants from the old bonds accompanied 82.6% of

181

See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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the offers in our sample, much in excess of the 33% to 46.6% range found in
earlier studies.182 The thing that needs explaining, then, is not why the issuers
included exit consents, but why nine issuers omitted them. In four of those
nine cases, the explanation is easy. Two were exchanges with no minimum
condition subject a cap on the number of new bonds, with proration to occur
in the event of oversubscription. In both cases, the maximum number of old
bonds to be accommodated fell short of the number of consents necessary to
amend the indentures. Two were exchanges concluded pursuant to side deals
without a further solicitation of non-signatory bondholders. All of the
remaining five offers fit the general profile. Significantly, all of them failed to
close, confirming the effectiveness of coercive tactics.
Coercion did not stop with exit consents. There was an “upstream” feature
in 59.6% of the offers, with the new bond offering junior secured status in
exchange for an unsecured old bond (65.2% of the debt-only offers had this
feature). As noted above, secured status has a negative effect on the value of
untendered old bonds and discourages holdouts.
There is also timing coercion. Fifty percent of the offers took advantage of
Williams Act exclusion of debt exchanges from the operation of the all-holders
rule to offer better terms for acceptances received by an early tender date.
Typically, this comes in the form of a new bond with a principal amount $20
to $50 higher than on the new bond received for late tenders. There were also
five cases of vote-buying in the form of a fee (typically $2.50) paid separately
for the exit consent.
Additionally, there is concrete evidence of a factor that, at least nominally,
counterbalances coercion—negotiation. Many issuers prenegotiate the offer
with large bondholders. A formal “restrcturing support agreement” between
the issuer and (usually) a majority of the bondholders preceded the offer in
45.8% of the cases. We suspect that the number of negotiated deals was
actually higher. Issuers hire advisors whose job it is to manage relationships
with the large bondholders. The fact that no formal agreement is reached does
not imply that discussions did not proceed in the ordinary course.
Finally, the new data confirm the older picture in one important respect:
eventual bankruptcy remains salient. Across the entire sample, 39% of the
issuers eventually went into bankruptcy reorganization or liquidation; 13%
were acquired by other companies; and 48% remained as independent
operating companies. Although the percentage is lower than in the earlier
studies, our sample incudes some recent closing dates. In the subset of
workouts commenced before January 1, 2016, 43% went bankrupt. We expect
the bankruptcy rate to continue to rise over time: three of the standing
companies remain in severe distress as of this writing.
182

See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text.
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2. Institutional and Household Bondholders
Another change in the workout pattern should be noted. This one
concerns the treatment of household bondholders, but not their numbers.
With bonds, institutions rose to the fore in the bondholder population more
than six decades ago. Figure 1 draws on the Federal Reserve Board’s Statistical
Release Z.1 to break out the percentage of bonds held by households since
1945. A notable shift to institutions occurred at the beginning of the period—
by 1953 household holdings had fallen from 31% to 11%. Since then the
household share has risen and fallen with surprising volatility, but has never
exceeded an upper 20% (1976 and 1994) and never fallen below a low of 5%
(1984). In 2015, the figure was the same 11% as in 1953 (which may itself be
surprisingly large to some).
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Figure 1: Household Sector Bondholdings, 1945-2015

Year

Today the question concerning the bondholder population goes less to
institutions versus households than to status under the federal securities laws.
Today’s issuers rely on the Rule 144A exemption from registration for the
securities offered in the exchange, an exemption requiring that only “qualified
institutional buyers” (QIBs) be solicited.183 QIBs are defined as substantial
183 See Anna Pinedo & Remmelt Reigersman, Debt Repurchases & Exchanges, MORRISON &
FOERSTER 1, 47 (Nov. 8, 2012), https://media2.mofo.com/documents/121108-debt-repurchases.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4QZW-3AR5] (noting that “[p]rivate exchange offers conducted pursuant to
Section 4(2) . . . [m]ay not constitute a ‘general solicitation’ and must be made only to ‘sophisticated
investors,’ usually qualified institutional buyers (QIBs).”).
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institutions or trust funds that own at least $100 million of securities on behalf
of unrelated parties.184 The offer process starts with the identification and
precertification of the QIBs in the bondholder group.185 Once the offer goes
forward, any mom-and-pop bondholders will not even receive it. They are, in
effect, written off as statutory holdouts. It is a complete reversal of the old
picture of the coerced, small investor. Rather than being coerced, the momand-pops are ignored as too small to matter.
E. Explaining the Changes
Clearly, something other than the temporary disappearance of DIP
financing in 2008–2009 and the 2009–2010 tax deferral is at work. We offer
two explanations, one keyed to the federal securities laws, and the other to
the power allocations within Chapter 11.
1. Registration Exemption
The first explanation lies in the fact that there has been a shift in securities
law compliance strategy. The contemporary bond workout took shape in the
early 1980s, when investment bank Drexel Burnham Lambert promoted
exchanges that made use of the registration exemption in 1933 Act section
3(a)(9).186 Section 3(a)(9), however, places unwelcome constraints on the
debtor’s investment bankers and other financial advisors. Under section
3(a)(9), financial advisors must be paid for their advice and may not be paid
success fees.187 They are also prohibited from soliciting consents or advising
offerees, even though they may negotiate with the bondholders, deliver
fairness opinions, and circulate disclosed information.188 Old school section
3(a)(9) exchange offers were, as a result, less likely to be fully negotiated.189
Today, Rule 144A provides a cheaper, more user-friendly alternative. Rule
144A allows for exchanges without constraining the conduct of investment
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(a)(i)-(iv) (2013) (defining QIBs).
See Pinedo & Reigersman, supra note 183, at 48 (noting that parties engaging in “private
exchange offers” should “[i]dentify and pre-certify (QIB, accredited investor status) investors”).
186 See Altman & Karlin, supra note 128, at 44 (noting that “The first instances of distressed
exchanges in the modern high-yield bond era were the so-called 3(a)9 exchanges championed by
Drexel Burnham Lambert in the 1980s.”).
187 See, e.g., Section 3(a)(9) Exchange Offers, MORRISON & FOERSTER 9 (June 5, 2009),
https://media2.mofo.com/documents/090605exchangeoffers.pdf [https://perma.cc/W4UA-54ZY]
(noting that “the SEC Staff has indicated through various no-action letters that a financial adviser
may receive a fixed fee for its services, not contingent upon the success of the exchange, plus
reasonable expenses related to the exchange”).
188 See id. at 6 (listing the “impermissible activities” for third parties such as financial advisors).
189 See Robert M. Mooradian & Harley E. Ryan, Jr., Financial Distress: Section 3(a)(9) Compared
to Investment Bank Managed Exchange Offers, 78 J. BUS. 1593, 1596-97 (2005) (explaining that
investment bankers make a difference because they deal directly with the bondholder offerees).
184
185
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bankers and other advisors engaged by the issuer. The bankers line up the
bondholders and work together with law firms and specialist restructuring
advisors to draft and negotiate restructuring support agreements.190 Hands-on
management by restructuring specialists is complemented by enhanced price
discovery, which facilitates evaluation of the value on offer in the exchange.191
The result is that the restructuring market has increasingly come to resemble
the mergers and acquisitions market, a space in which intermediaries guide
managers and investors toward closing. The day of the unnegotiated exchange
offer has passed.
2. Creditor Control in Chapter 11
The second explanation lies in the power shift to the creditor side in
Chapter 11. Chapter 11 has increasingly become a creditor-controlled process,
specifically a process controlled by the senior secured lender, which is often
also the DIP financier.192 Whereas public firms filing for bankruptcy in the
1980s and 1990s often had significant unencumbered assets, most public firms
that file for bankruptcy now have few, if any, assets not subject to liens.193 The
lack of unencumbered assets gives the secured creditor a pervasive veto over
the bankrupt company’s business decisions—even use of cash generated by
operations falls into the zone of creditor consent.194 In addition, an
Altman, supra note 157, at 78.
Id.; see also Press Release, Cumulus, Cumulus Enters Restructuring Support Agreement to
Reduce Debt by Over $1 Billion (Nov. 29, 2017) (on file with University of Pennsylvania Law
Review) (describing restructuring support agreement and closing with mention of a law firm, a
financial advisor, and a restructuring advisor).
192 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV.
673, 675 (2003) (noting that “if the experience of large businesses leaving Chapter 11 in 2002 is any
guide, those at the helm do the bidding of the creditors throughout the case”); Douglas G. Baird &
Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751, 784 (2002) (asserting that “[t]he
revolving credit facility, installed as the firm begins to have trouble making debt payments, also gives
the lender who runs it the ability to control the firm inside of Chapter 11 as well as out”); David A.
Skeel, Jr., Creditors’ Ball: The “New” New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917,
919 (2003) (noting that “lenders are using [DIP] loan contracts to influence corporate governance
in bankruptcy”); cf. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Nature of the Bankrupt Firm: A Response to Baird and
Rasmussen’s The End of Bankruptcy, 56 STAN. L. REV. 645, 666 (2003) (arguing that “boards of
directors rather than DIP lenders control most large, public firms in reorganization”).
193 See Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11,
1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 511, 523 (2009) (noting the large percentage of firms whose assets are
“encumbered by liens”). A revision of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code that went into
effect in 2001 facilitated this change. Prior to 2001, creditors had jurisdictionally spotty and uncertain
rights to take and maintain a security interest in deposit accounts. Since 2001, the Uniform
Commercial Code has expressly permitted security interests in deposit accounts. See U.C.C. § 9-104
(listing the ways in which secured parties can control deposit accounts).
194 The cash is likely to be the proceeds of a secured creditor’s collateral and thus also subject
to the lien. U.C.C. § 9-315; see also 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2012) (providing that postpetition, a
security interest “extends to such proceeds, products, offspring, or profits acquired by the estate after
190
191
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amendment to the Bankruptcy Code in 2005 limited the time during which the
debtor has the exclusive right to propose a plan, thereby diminishing one of
management’s key negotiating advantages: the threat of interminable delay.195
Secured creditors usually agree to act as DIP lenders, and DIP financing
agreements present a second, even more potent power source. DIP loans
come with not only superpriority status, but also highly invasive promises
and conditions—inter alia, detailed budgets, timelines, and the right to
approve the appointment of a “Chief Restructuring Officer.”196 DIP lenders
often use their control to buy the company, either by forcing a sale of the
debtor’s assets (at which the lender has the advantage of credit bidding) or
pushing through a cramdown restructuring in which the lender ends up with
a controlling stake in the equity.197 Such processes effectively sidestep many
of the key protections for other, more junior creditor constituencies in Chapter
11, even while complying with the literal terms of the Bankruptcy Code.198

the commencement of the case”). Bankruptcy law prohibits the debtor from using this “cash
collateral” unless it either provides the secured creditor with “adequate protection” of its interest in
the collateral, something that is usually impossible given the debtor’s lack of unencumbered assets,
or obtains the consent of the secured creditor for the use of the cash. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. 363(c)(2)
(2012) (prohibiting trustee from using the cash collateral except in two narrow situations); see also 11
U.S.C. § 361(1) (2012) (noting that “adequate protection may be provided by requiring the trustee
to make a cash payment or periodic cash payments”).
195 The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, codified in the
Bankruptcy Code at 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d)(2)(A), sets limits on the time during which the debtor can file plans.
196 See, e.g., LEVITIN, supra note 21, at 797-99 (noting that “[t]he right to appoint a chief
restructuring officer is a striking measure of DIP lender power”); Sris Chatterjee, Upinder S.
Dhillon & Gabriel G. Ramirez, Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 28 J. BANKING & FIN. 3097, 3107
(2004) (concluding that “DIP loans consistently include restrictive covenants that are similar to
covenants of bank loans, presumably the type of pre-petition loans held by lenders”); see also
Sreedhar T. Bharath, Venkatesh Panchapagesan & Ingrid M. Werner, The Changing Nature of Chapter
11 20 (Fisher Coll. of Bus., Working Paper No. 2008-03-003, Nov. 2010) (finding a 65% increase in
management turnover rates in bankruptcy between 1990 and the early 2000s, with a 200% increase
in the turnover rate for managers with significant equity holdings).
197 An increasing percentage of plan distributions appear to comply with the absolute priority
rule, a marker of diminished managerial power in bankruptcy. Compare Ayotte & Morrison, supra
note 193, at 523 (showing APR violations in 12% of Chapter 11 plans, and payments to equityholders
in 18% of plans for cases filed in 2001) and Vedran Capkun & Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution
and the Restoration of Priority of Claims 12 (HEC Paris Research Paper No. ACC-2016-1160, 2016)
(reporting APR violations in 37% of recent cases), with Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct
Costs and Enforcement of Claims, 2 J. LEGAL ECON. 79, 85 (1992) (citing APR violations in 78% of 37
cases studied) and Julian R. Franks & Walter N. Torous, An Empirical Investigation of U.S. Firms in
Reorganization, 44 J. FIN. 747, 754 (1989) (finding APR violations in 78% of cases in the 1980s).
198 Neither the best interest test, which guarantees that creditors receive at least as much value
in Chapter 11 as in a Chapter 7 liquidation, nor the absolute priority rule, which protects unsecured
creditors from value being diverted to equity, matter because creditors receive their liquidation
rights, and nothing more. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (2012) (stating the best interest test); 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(b)(2)(C) (2012) (stating the absolute priority rule). Likewise, plan feasibility, as
stated in 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11), does not matter because in this new world, the Chapter 11 plan does
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Chapter 11, then, often becomes a vehicle for the senior secured creditor
to carry out a foreclosure sale, either of specific assets or of the entire firm,
often to itself. Debtors have little wiggle room, evasive maneuvers having
come to naught in the bankruptcy courts.199
Increased secured creditor control implies incentive adjustments for the
other members of the cast of characters. Certainly, bankruptcy is less
attractive than heretofore for the debtor’s managers.200 The same will be the
case for its unsecured financial creditors. Their interests often do not favor
asset sales and other fast track strategies, making them more amenable to an
out-of-court settlement, even a flawed one, so long as it provides a significant
reduction in bankruptcy costs and averts the possibility of a settlement
skewed to the interests of the secured class. This does not imply that an outof-court composition somehow imports unilateral power to evade the secured
creditor and injure its interests;201 it merely shows that the other players see
things differently. Where bankruptcy once offered a comfort zone, today’s
managers have every reason to avoid it. Meanwhile, bondholder calculations
will have shifted in the direction of cooperation.
Indeed, the presence of dominant secured creditors is directly evidenced
by the proliferation of second liens in the new bonds in our data sample.
Restructuring support agreements are ubiquitous in bankruptcy as well as in
workouts. They set out constraints and timetables similar to those in DIP
financing agreements, but go further, lining up support for a stated

not promise to pay junior creditors anything. And the Chapter 11 good faith requirement, as stated
in 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3), has little bearing on such a plan.
199 These include “new value” plans that would let old equity holders retain the equity in the
reorganized company in exchange for a non-market-tested contribution of new value. Under these
“gift plans,” seniors agree to pay off out-of-the-money equity in order to facilitate a quick plan
confirmation, and restrictions on credit bidding at asset sales are designed to prevent senior secured
lenders from purchasing assets. Courts, however, have held that these ploys violate various
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. See RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132
S. Ct. 2065, 2070-73 (2013) (prohibiting restriction of credit bidding under 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(1)(iii)); Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S.
434, 458 (1999) (prohibiting cramdown confirmation of new value plans that violate absolute priority
when there is not a market test); In re DBSD Nor. Am. Inc., 634 F.3d 79, 93-101 (2d Cir. 2016)
(prohibiting plan that would have violated absolute priority rule); In re Armstrong World Indus.,
432 F.3d 507, 514-15 (3d Cir. 2005) (refusing to confirm plan that violated absolute priority rule).
200 See Barry E. Adler, Vedran Capkun & Lawrence A. Weiss, Value Destruction in the New Era
of Chapter 11, 29 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 461, 479 (2013) (showing that the shift to creditor control may
cause management to “aggressively” delay filing).
201 Such a case would exist where there is no secured creditor or where the secured creditor
has a limited claim or lien. The unsecured creditors would likely take the downsides of DIP-financed
Chapter 11 into account in evaluating the present giveups bound up in a workout designed to return
the issuer to sustainability.
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outcome.202 Nothing stops an issuer and a secured creditor from beginning
the negotiating process before a bankruptcy filing. An exchange offer can
figure in at this point, posing a cost-effective alternative to a prepac filing.
What matters is less the venue of composition than the negotiating
framework, which proceeds in much the same mode whether the context is a
workout, a prepac, or a full-dress Chapter 11.
These, then, are the new bond workouts: exchange offers made to QIBs
as an incident of the new politics of Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
F. Summary
Our review of restructuring practice has important implications for the
policy discussion directed to section 316(b). The recent developments
undercut the polar positions of both Professors Roe and Brudney.
As to Roe, any opportunity costs stemming from distortions related to
section 316(b)’s restructuring barrier have been ameliorated substantially.
Holdouts no longer systematically prevent deals from closing. This is not just
a matter of across-the-board issuer coercion. Many offers proceed successfully
without a 90% tender condition. When substantial tenders come in but do
not reach 90%, the issuer tends to waive the condition and close anyway. If
bondholder retribution in the wake of such bait-and-switch maneuvers were
a problem, issuers would be forced to make minimum tender conditions
unwaivable so as to make their offers credible. In cases where the out-of-court
route is unfeasible or undesirable, bankruptcy affords a faster, cheaper
alternative than before. To the extent that section 316(b) has a potential to do
harm, the markets have figured out how to minimize it.
The problems that concerned Brudney203 also have lost salience. Mom-andpop bondholders already had largely disappeared from the holding group at the
time he wrote.204 Any disabling coordination problems on the part of bondholding
institutions are much diminished as well, to the extent they exist at all.
To say that the markets can live with section 316(b) does not also say that
they would be better off with it than without it. Even as the force has gone
out of the case for outright repeal, it also has gone out of the case for
retention. Coercive tactics are more salient than ever. There are also new
factors in the policy calculus. To the extent that secured creditor control
(along with restructuring support agreements that follow from it) is skewing
202 See generally Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Quiet Revolution (Univ. of Chi. Coase-Sandor
Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 755, 2016) (detailing the “quiet revolution” of
restructuring support agreements and their impact on modern bankruptcy).
203 See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 13, at 1826-27 (describing the systematic difficulties that public
bondholders face in bankruptcy).
204 See supra Figure 1 (showing decrease in household bondholdings).
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bankruptcy into undesirable directions, the new workouts’ negotiated aspect,
rather than being an ameliorating factor, becomes subsumed in a larger
problem. But that is a problem for bankruptcy courts to address.
IV. RETAIN OR REPEAL?
The new workout is a hardball game. Dissatisfied bondholders have
pushed back, persuading courts in the Southern District of New York to adopt
a reading of TIA section 316(b) that extends its prohibitive reach beyond
direct amendment of payment terms to any change effected in a restructuring
negatively impacting the value of the bonds. This broad reading of section
316(b) disrupted practice assumptions going back three-quarters of a century
and triggered more litigation. Uncertainty resulted for bond counsel
regarding opinion letters on the validity and enforceability of trust
indentures, prompting representatives of twenty-eight prominent law firms
to issue a joint interpretive statement.205 Industry representatives even
slipped a clause retroactively overruling the cases into an (unenacted)
appropriations bill.206 But the status quo finally was restored when, in January
2017, a panel of the Second Circuit reinstated the traditional reading of section
316(b) in a 2–1 decision over a strong dissent.207 The ruling consigns the broad
reading to history unless a contrary decision in another circuit keeps it alive.
The sturm und drang surrounding the broad reading’s rise and fall awakens
the dormant policy question regarding repeal of section 316(b). The broad
reading threw a wrench into today’s workout machinery, making section
316(b) more counterproductive than ever. At the same time, the facts of the
cases that inspired the new interpretation cast an unflattering light on the
distortionary tactics that drive the new restructuring, suggesting a need for a
revised approach. The issue respecting repeal can be expected to persist even
assuming, as seems likely, that the Second Circuit panel opinion definitively
205 N.Y. BAKER BOTTS, LLP, ET AL., OPINION WHITE PAPER ON RECENT JUDICIAL OPINIONS
RELATING TO TIA SECTION 316(B) (Apr. 25, 2016), available at https://www.ropesgray.com/newsroom/
alerts/2016/April/Opinion-White-Paper-on-Recent-Judicial-Opinions-Relating-to-TIA-Section-316b.aspx
[https://perma.cc.9GRS-HNGG].
206 See Liz Moyer, Wall Street’s Debt Restructuring Fight Heads to Washington, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK
(Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/08/business/dealbook/wall-streets-debt-restructuringfight-heads-to-washington.html (describing how proposed amendment to Trust Indenture Act would
“hand a victory to Apollo Global Management”); Matt Jarzemsky, Caesars Takes Aim at Law Aiding
Creditors, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 6, 2015, 9:52 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/caesars-takes-aim-at-lawaiding-creditors-1449445319 (noting how Apollo Global Management supported legislation to amend the
TIA in order to “gut” lawsuits brought by bondholders of Caesars Entertainment). We note that we both
were signatories to a legal scholar’s letter to Congressional leadership opposing the proposed amendment
of the TIA through the appropriations process.
207 See Marblegate Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Educ. Mgmt. Fin. Corp., 846 F.3d 1, 3 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding
that “[s]ection 316(b) prohibits only non-consensual amendments to an indenture’s core payment terms”).
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reestablishes the traditional reading. The repeal question returns in a policy
context very different from that prevailing at the time Professors Roe and
Brudney debated the matter decades ago. As we saw in Part III, bankruptcy
is less costly, the dysfunctional restructuring is a thing of the past, and
negotiated workouts now present a viable alternative. There may be power
imbalances on the fact patterns, but bondholder collective action problems no
longer contribute to them. Now that the broad reading is off the table, it
would seem that issuers and bondholders can continue to live with section
316(b) without excess discomfiture. But, at the same time, coercive tactics have
assumed greater salience. Maybe it is time to put CACs back on the process table.
The literature describes two contrasting means to that end—qualified
repeal with continuing SEC control and outright repeal that leaves the future
process regime in the hands of indenture drafters. The primary point of
difference lies in the observer’s view of the efficacy of bond contracting.
Professor Roe makes the case for qualified repeal. He projects that
contractual adjustment will be slow and rigid, with issuers resisting CACs
due to worries about negative bond market signals.208 In addition, selfinterested bondholder voting will remain a problem under CAC
indentures—separate lending relationships between issuers and
bondholders will result in side payments.209 He accordingly suggests that
the SEC exercise its exemptive power under TIA section 304210 to allow
indentures to include two-thirds majority CACs on the condition that the
provisions bar coercive transactions and disqualify conflicted votes.211
208 See Roe, supra note 104, at 273-74 (noting that “[s]ignalling and agency costs” are two
reasons why managers would avoid “majority action clauses”).
209 See id. at 270 (noting that “even the votes now permitted can be structured to distort
bondholder choice by offering assenting bondholders side payments”).
210 Trust Indenture Act section 304(d), amended by 15 U.S.C. § 77ddd(d) (2012), provides that
“the Commission may, by rules or regulations upon its own motion . . . exempt conditionally or
unconditionally any person, security or transaction, or any class or classes of persons, registration
statements, indentures, securities, or transactions, from any one or more of the provisions of this
subchapter, if and to the extent that such exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest
and consistent with the protection of investors and the purposes fairly intended by this subchapter.”
The section’s legislative history also allows this on a literal read, although the examples stated therein
are of a considerably lesser magnitude than the exemption Roe proposes. The reports and testimony
variously describe the amendments to section 304(d) as facilitating adjustments to new
developments in debt security design and underwriting, citing in particular the appearance of
securitization. See Trust Indenture Reform: Hearing on H.R. 1786 Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms.
and Fin. of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong. 28 (1989) (statement of David S. Ruder,
Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission), microformed on Sup. Docs. No. Y 4.En 2/3:101-48
(U.S. Gov’t Printing Office) (supporting the Trust Indenture Reform Act of 1989 on the theory that
“Changes in the types of debt securities, in the methods of public financing, and in the character of
relations between obligors and their financial intermediaries have created situations not anticipated
when the act was passed in 1939.”).
211 See Mark J. Roe, Commentary, The Trust Indenture Act of 1939 in Congress and the Courts in
2016: Bringing the SEC Back to the Table, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 360, 372 (2016) (recommending that
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Professor Marcel Kahan counters with a case for outright repeal.212 For
Kahan, there is no justification for any mandated terms in bond contracts.
Between good information diffusion,213 robust pricing,214 and almost universal
institutional holding, bondholders can protect themselves.215 He does not
deny that coercive devices play an important role in workouts, but takes the
position that coercion by itself does not justify a preclusive mandate such as
that embodied in section 316(b).216
This Part explores these alternatives, taking a position in the middle. That
is, we favor outright repeal but enter a doctrinal caveat—outright repeal
would work best against a background threat of judicial intervention.
Standard trust indentures do address process matters related to amendment
and exchange offers. Indenture drafters also adjust indenture forms in
response to external shocks. But the process is indeed slow and the results are
variable—some indentures do a better job of addressing process
contingencies than do others. Meanwhile, depending on the drafting, a CAC
indenture can expand the list of coercive possibilities. We think the drafters
will be more likely to focus on the process issues and treatment alternatives
with a judicial officer on patrol.
Section A takes a brief look at the broad reading of section 316(b), laying
out the facts of the leading cases and our critical analysis of the reading’s
application. We also take note of its merits, describing circumstances where
its application could be defended as commonsense policing.
We turn to the repeal question in Section B. We explain our doubts about
further SEC involvement in workouts and go on to show that trust indenture
drafters are more responsive to the stresses of restructuring than some
observers have conceded heretofore. Indentures contain an elaborate set of
the SEC “exempt bond indentures from section 316(b) if they (1) provide for a binding vote on
payment terms approved by two-thirds of the bondholders, without the vote of any conflicted
bondholder, and (2) bar coercive transactions such as exit-consent exchange offers”). This is the
second iteration of the proposal. In the 1987 paper, Roe suggested an SEC rulemaking pursuant to
which core indenture terms could be amended by a two-thirds vote and exit consents would be
prohibited; in addition, conflicted voting would be addressed through the interpolation of the
Bankruptcy Code’s rules on voting disqualification, and second, by self-reporting of insider status
by the bondholders. See Roe, supra note 104, at 270-71 (proposing a “new Rule 316”).
212 See Marcel Kahan, The Qualified Case Against Mandatory Terms in Bonds, 89 NW. U. L. REV.
565, 622 (1995) (concluding that “no mandatory prohibition should be imposed.”).
213 See id. at 603 (describing how “the collective action problems for bondholders are not as
great as they are for shareholders”).
214 See id. at 579 (noting that “studies of informational efficiency in the bond market establish
that at least some legal terms are priced”).
215 Kahan cited his own study of covenant amendments, which found that less than half of the
solicitations succeeded as originally proposed; that in 42% of the cases bondholder resistance resulted
in improved terms; and that 17% of the solicitations failed altogether. Id. at 604 (citing Marcel Kahan
& Bruce Tuckman, Do Bondholders Lose from Junk Bond Covenant Changes?, 66 J. BUS. 499 (1993)).
216 See id. at 605 (noting that the coercion argument “lacks any plausibility in the bondholder context”).

2018]

The New Bond Workouts

1649

process rules operating against the background of section 316(b). We surveyed
the terms of two sets of indentures governing bonds issued under 144A, one
set issued in 2011 and the second in 2016. The findings are surprising: first,
UACs cover considerably wider ground than required under section 316(b),
and, second, a majority of the contracts explicitly sanction exit consents. We
also show that indenture drafters adjust to background shocks, in this case,
the broad reading—a subset of the 2016 indentures draft out from under
section 316(b). That said, Section C goes on to predict that process problems
will persist in the wake of repeal. To achieve an even playing field, one needs
indentures containing completely drafted process rules. Our dataset does not
support a prediction that the drafters will respond comprehensively to the
process questions that would arise in the wake of section 316(b)’s repeal.
Section D lays out our recommendation. The contractual good faith duty,
as we have seen, only rarely comes to bear against bond issuers, amounting to
considerably less than a threat. Given this, we project that in the event section
316(b) repeal resulted in anything short of comprehensive revision of trust
indentures, that CACs could be combined with exchange offers and exit
consents with devastatingly coercive effect. Further, given repeal, exit
consents would lose the expedient attractiveness they currently enjoy as a
weapon against holdouts. We project that pressure for judicial intervention
would build up accordingly, and describe a robust basis for justifying it—a
revived intercreditor duty of good faith.
A. The Rise and Fall of the Broad Reading of Section 316(b)
In a 1999 case called Federated Strategic Income Fund v. Mechala Grp.
Jamaica Ltd.,217 a court in the Southern District of New York disregarded the
traditional reading of TIA section 316(b), substituting a broader
interpretation that considerably extended the section’s prohibitive scope.218
Under the traditional understanding, the reader takes the statutory
language—“the right . . . to receive payment of the principal of and interest
on such . . . security . . . shall not be impaired or affected without the
consent” of the holder—interpolates the contract’s promise to pay as the
“right,” and interprets “impair” and “affect” to refer to amendment or waiver
of the promise.219 It follows that section 316(b) only applies to amendments
217 See No. 99-10517, 1999 WL 993648, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 1999) (discussing a restructuring
effected by an exchange offer and exit consents that moved assets out of obligor entities and lifted
guaranties of the bonds).
218 Id. at *7.
219 See generally N.Y. BAKER BOTTS, LLP, ET AL., OPINION WHITE PAPER ON RECENT
JUDICIAL OPINIONS RELATING TO TIA SECTION 316(B) (Apr. 25, 2016), available at
https://www.ropesgray.com/newsroom/alerts/2016/April/Opinion-White-Paper-on-Recent-Judicial-
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and waivers of payment terms. A thin case law confirmed the reading,220 which
guided practice in financial markets and law firms. Under the broad reading,
the impairment of the right to be paid encompasses any unconsented action
under the trust indenture undertaken in connection with a restructuring that
compromises the issuer’s ability to pay the bonds, even if the bond is not
amended. “Impair” and “affect” are, under this interpretation, any
unconsented changes that make it less likely that a bondholder will be repaid.
No one paid much attention to Mechala until the Southern District of
New York decided a trio of workout cases in 2014 and 2015: Marblegate Asset
Mgmt. v. Educ. Mgmt. Corp.,221 Meehancombs Glob. Credit Opportunities Funds,
LP v. Caesars Entm’t Corp. (Caesars I),222 and BOKF, N.A. v. Caesars Entm’t
Corp. (Caesars II).223 The court found that all three restructurings potentially
violated the TIA, relying on the broad reading. Then, in January 2017, a panel
of the Second Circuit reversed the Marblegate ruling.224 The reversal consigns
the broad reading to history unless continued litigation in the case or a
contrary decision in another circuit keeps it alive. Whatever the outcome, the
distorted playing field in out-of-court restructurings returns to the forefront
as an unresolved policy problem.
The broad reading implicated two issues. The first concerned the TIA and
its legislative history. The Southern District drew purposive inferences from
the legislative history225 in support of the broad reading, while the Second
Opinions-Relating-to-TIA-Section-316b.aspx [https://perma.cc.9GRS-HNGG] (providing guidance in
the interpretation of section 316(b)).
220 See, e.g., YRC Worldwide Inc. v. Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Am., No. 10-2106, 2010 WL
2680336, at *6 (D. Kan. July 1, 2010) (agreeing with other courts that section 316(b) applies to
holders’ legal, not practical, rights); In re Nw. Corp., 313 B.R. 595, 600 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004)
(holding that the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 protects “the holder’s legal rights and not the holder’s
practical rights to the principal and interest itself ”); see also Upic & Co. v. Kinder-Care Learning
Ctrs., Inc., 793 F. Supp. 448, 455-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (opining that section 316(b) guarantees the
procedural right to sue on the promise but does not “alter the substance of a noteholder’s right to
payment of principal and interest under the Indenture and, in particular, cannot ‘override’ the
Indenture’s subordination provisions”).
221 75 F. Supp. 3d 592 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), rev’d, 846 F.3d 1 (2d Cir. 2017).
222 See 80 F. Supp. 3d 507, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (upholding the broad interpretation of section
316(b) using Marblegate reasoning).
223 See 144 F. Supp. 3d 459, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (noting that section 316(b) must be
interpreted in accordance with “the purpose underlying the provision—allow[ing] for corporate
flexibility while protecting minority bondholders”).
224 See Marblegate Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Educ. Mgmt. Fin. Corp., 846 F.3d 1, 17 (2d Cir. 2017)
(reversing and remanding the judgment of the district court).
225 See id. at 8 (noting that the District Court understood the legislative history to reveal
“Congress’s broad intent to prohibit an out-of-court debt restructuring that has the purpose and effect
of eliminating any possibility of receiving payment under their notes.”). The court fairly characterized
the language of section 316(b) as ambiguous. A cursory look at the legislative history limited to the
“evasion of judicial scrutiny” line from the committee reports followed. See supra text accompanying note
56 (discussing House and Senate reports containing “evasion of judicial scrutiny” language). Effectuation
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Circuit’s reinstatement of the narrow reading followed from a closer look at the
historical evidence.226 The appellate court had much the better of the
argument: there is specific evidence that Congress intended to bar only
unconsented amendment of payment terms. The second issue concerned the
substantive merits: whether the broad reading improved workout practice by
ushering in a constructive regime of judicial policing. The courts of the
Southern District clearly thought so. The Second Circuit, however, expressed
no views on the matter, reinstating the traditional reading solely by reference
to the legislative history. Our own view is mixed, but ultimately negative. The
broad reading did facilitate intervention against egregious overreaching in
workouts. But it also overreached, disrupting settled allocations of risk without
targeting the problem of distorted choice at its source.
To see the problems, one only needs to look at Marblegate’s facts. The case
concerned Education Management Corporation (EDMC), a distressed forprofit education provider that could not file for Chapter 11 without losing its
eligibility for federal student aid revenue, which would have precluded any
reorganization attempt.227 The company’s operating subsidiary had a $1 billion
secured bank loan and around $200 million of unsecured notes issued under
a TIA indenture, both issues guaranteed by the parent.228 Significantly, the
parent’s guaranty of the unsecured notes was a “tag along,” which meant that
the guaranty had been created in connection with the bank loan and could be
terminated at the bank’s option.229 EDMC, the bank, and 81% of the
noteholders agreed to a negotiated composition that allocated the bank 55
of the purpose, said the court, meant reading the section to protect “the ability, and not merely the formal
right, to receive payment in some circumstances.” See Marblegate, 846 F.3d at 5 (summarizing district
court’s analysis of section 316(b) when deciding whether to grant preliminary injunction).
226 See id. at 9 (“Based on our review of the legislative history of Section 316(b), we conclude
that Congress did not intend the broad reading that Marblegate urges and the District Court
embraced.”). The appellate panel drilled down into the legislative history and came up with a very
different story. Yes, Congress wanted to push restructuring into bankruptcy. But Congress only took
a limited step in pursuing the goal, to wit, prohibiting “non-consensual amendments of core payment
terms (that is, the amount of principal and interest owed, and the date of maturity.).” Id. at 7. The
Court reviewed the famous SEC Report, see supra text accompanying note 58, and found no mention
of an objective to require unanimous consent to all out-of-court restructurings. The Court went on
to consider the congressional committee process, focusing on the testimony of SEC chair William
O. Douglas in 1938 and the assistant director of the SEC’s reorganization division, Edmund Burke,
Jr., in 1939. This was the pay dirt. Douglas had stressed that the section covered only amendment
and waiver of payment terms, and Burke has noted that the barrier went only to an unconsented
“variation from [the] contract.” Marblegate, 846 F.3d at 12.
227 See Marblegate Asset Mgmt. v. Educ. Mgmt. Corp., 75 F. Supp. 3d 592, 595 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(noting that EDMC depended on this source of revenue because it accounted for 78.6% of its revenues).
228 See id. at 597 (explaining that EDMC’s $1.553 billion in outstanding debt “consists of $1.305
billion in secured debt, divided between $220 million drawn from a revolving credit facility and
$1.085 billion in term loans, and $217 million in unsecured loans”).
229 See id. at 597-98 (discussing release of the guarantor).
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cents on the dollar, the unsecured notes 33 cents on the dollar, and for all
intents and purposes wiped out the common stock.230 But, because the deal
implicated the indenture’s payment terms and bankruptcy was not an option,
unanimous consent was necessary.231 A single hedge fund holdout blocked the
deal. The dealmakers accordingly resorted to a backup plan, under which the
bank foreclosed on the subsidiary’s assets and lifted the parent guaranty, and
then consented to the transfer of the assets to a new, unencumbered
subsidiary in exchange for the same deal that the holdout earlier had
rejected.232 The difference was that this time the holdout had no choice in the
matter and, as a claimant against a subsidiary (the assets of which had been
stripped), was left with nothing.233
Undaunted, the holdout sought an injunction, which, had it been granted,
would have brought down the company.234 The Southern District refused to
grant the injunction but found in favor of the holdout on the likelihood of
success on the merits.235 The transaction neither amended nor waived any
term of the note or the indenture and so did not create an issue under the
traditional reading of section 316(b). But the Court invoked the broad reading
to find a violation: the minority bondholder had been “disinherited” without
its consent in connection with a “restructuring.”236 The holdout, said the
court, had been offered a choice between 33 cents on the dollar and zero,
which is no choice at all, justifying an override of the terms of the contract
under section 316(b).237 It did not matter to the court that the guaranty, as a
tag-along, was a contingent right whose contingency had failed, and had been
judicially reconferred on the bondholders ex post.
Ironically, there was nothing normatively troubling about the
unconsented cramdown. The term overridden was not “just boilerplate.” We
surveyed 109 trust indentures (49 executed in 2011 before Marblegate, and 60
executed thereafter in 2016) and found that most (82%), but not all, of the
indentures containing guaranties (76%) took steps to include the guaranty in
See id. at 600-01 (detailing the specific requirements of the restructuring).
See id. (noting that restructuring could only proceed with the consent of 100% of the
creditors and Plaintiffs’ decision not to participate in the Exchange Offer).
232 See id. at 601-02 (describing the “Intercompany Sale” procedure).
233 See id. at 601-02 (quoting the Exchange Offering Circular, which clearly spelled out the
financial consequences of not tendering all notes).
234 See id. at 603 (describing scope of relief sought by plaintiffs).
235 See id. at 605-11 (denying Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction but explaining why
“Plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits”).
236 See id. at 615 (“But where a debt reorganization that seeks to involuntarily disinherit the
dissenting minority is brought about by a majority vote, that violates the fundamental purpose of
the Trust Indenture Act.”).
237 See id. at 616 (arguing that “Plaintiffs may have been warned that modifications were
possible, but they were not told that they could be forced to accept a wholesale abandonment of their
right to receive payment.”).
230
231
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their UACs, even though the TIA does not necessarily require inclusion.238
The inclusion makes sense—guaranties can figure critically in the structure
of promises creating a given issue’s borrowing base. At the same time, 98% of
the guaranties had release provisions and accordingly contingent status, even
as most of them could not be amended. Only 28% of the guaranties contained
a tag-along condition, implying specific focus, deal by deal. The override of
guaranty release in Marblegate raised a serious policy question accordingly.
Furthermore, there was no statutory basis for justifying the contract
override on the facts of the case. Even if Congress, back in 1939, had expressed
an intent to force workouts into bankruptcy, bankruptcy was not a viable
alternative for this case’s debtor, EDMC.239 Nor did the process employed in
the case raise any red flags. The deal, based on negotiation, had garnered
supermajority bondholder support, and the cramdown foreclosure was
resorted to only as a last ditch move against a holdout.240 From a policy
perspective, there was nothing about which to object.
The broad reading, in sum, was overly broad and fact insensitive. But, at
the same time, it had its merits when deployed in the right case, as Caesars I
and II demonstrate. Caesars involved aggressive debt-equity management in
the wake of a private equity buyout. Caesars I concerned pre-buyout bonds
issued by an operating subsidiary and guarantied by the parent.241 Following
losses, the parent started an asset-stripping program, moving assets from the
operating subsidiary to a new unencumbered subsidiary.242 The indenture
erected two barriers to the program, first the parent guaranty, and, second, a
successor obligor clause triggered by sales of substantially all assets.243 But
both terms were susceptible to majority amendment.244 The parent divided
the bondholders into a 51% in-group with which it apparently had other

238 We note, however, that the TIA defines “obligor” to include “guarantor,” suggesting that if the
right to payment is from an obligor, it includes a guaranty of that payment as well. 15 U.S.C. § 77ccc(12)
(2012). TIA section 316(b) does not use the term “obligor,” however. 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(b) (2012).
239 See Marblegate Asset Mgmt. v. Educ. Mgmt. Corp., 75 F. Supp. 3d 592, 596 (S.D.N.Y.
2014) (noting that “an institution loses its eligibility for Title IV funds if it, or a controlling
affiliate, files for bankruptcy”).
240 See id. at 601 (noting the broad support for the restricting plan).
241 See MeehanCombs Glob. Credit Opportunities Master Fund, LP v. Caesars Entm’t Corp.,
80 F. Supp. 3d 507, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (describing the notes issued by Ceasers Entertainment
Operating Company, a Ceasers’ subsidiary, prior to Ceasers’ acquisition in a leveraged buyout).
242 See id. at 511 (describing the details of the parent’s attempt to transfer assets while
retaining company debt).
243 See Complaint at ¶ 5, MeehanCombs Glob. Credit Opportunities Master Fund, LP v.
Caesars Entm’t Corp., 80 F. Supp. 3d 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (No. 14-7091) (noting two of the Note
Purchase and Support Agreement’s “critical provisions”: “(1) the Guarantees by CEC for payment
of principal and interest, and (2) a covenant in the governing Indentures that would prevent Caesars
from transferring all or substantially all of CEOC’s assets”).
244 See id. (noting that the Favored Noteholders were required to amend the agreement).
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lending relationships, and a 49% out-group. With the bonds trading for 48
cents on the dollar, the parent redeemed those held by the in-group for 100
cents on the dollar, collecting exit consents from the in-group that lifted the
guaranty and reset the successor obligor clause so that the subsidiary’s
denuded asset base now comprised all of its assets within its meaning.245 The
out-group sued, and won easily under the broad reading—the guaranty
removal amounted to an unconsented restructuring.246
Caesars II concerned the operating subsidiary’s post-buyout bonds, also
guaranteed by the parent. This guaranty was conditioned on the subsidiary
being “wholly-owned.”247 Looking to get the guaranty lifted, the subsidiary
issued its own near-worthless common stock, first, to a friendly bank lending
group,248 and, second, to its own directors and officers under a ginned-up
equity compensation plan.249 When this second group of bondholders sued
under 316(b), the company took the position that no “restructuring” within
the meaning of the broad reading had occurred—the subsidiary was solvent
and no obligations were being scaled down.250 The court held that impairment
for 316(b) purposes still could obtain and referred the matter over for fact
finding on the question whether this really was a restructuring.251
Caesars showcases the good side of the broad reading, for between the
Caesars I vote-buying and the Caesars II strategic equity placements, there was
ample cause for judicial intervention. The demonstration of fit is unsurprising,
for we have seen in this Article’s Parts I, II, and III that distorted consent-giving
in workouts continues to be a cognizable problem, a problem that remains
unaddressed by conventional policing tools due to the courts’ longstanding habit
of refusing to apply contract good faith to financial contracts.
While Marblegate left unresolved some questions about the border between
core and non-core bondholder rights (e.g., is collateral part of the right to
See id. at ¶ 72 (noting that this price was “more than a 100% premium over market”).
See Caesars I, 80 F. Supp. 3d 507, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (holding that “the Complaint’s
plausible allegations that the August 2014 Transaction stripped plaintiffs of the valuable CEC
Guarantees leaving them with an empty right to assert a payment default from an insolvent issuer
are sufficient to state a claim under section 316(b)”).
247 See BOKF, N.A. v. Caesars Entm’t Corp., 144 F. Supp. 3d 459, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (noting
that “[a]ccording to CEC, because CEOC was no longer a wholly owned subsidiary, the Guarantee
was automatically terminated under section 12.02(c)(i) of the Indentures.”).
248 See id. (noting that “CEC sold five percent of CEOC’s common stock to certain
institutional investors”).
249 See id. at 464 (reciting that “CEC authorized the CEOC Board to adopt a 2014 stock performance
incentive plan, which enabled CEOC to grant shares of CEOC stock to its directors and officers”).
250 See id. at 473 (characterizing CEC’s view as that “plaintiffs must establish a restructuring
of their particular debt” to prove impairment).
251 See id. at 465-466 (holding that 316(b) protects noteholders against impairment of the right
to receive payment); see also id. at 475 (permitting “limited discovery” to “determine whether a
restructuring occurred”).
245
246
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payment?), it made clear that section 316(b) is to be read narrowly. Even so,
section 316(b) still presents an obstacle for workouts, leading to calls for its
repeal, as discussed in the next section.
B. The Case for Outright Repeal of Section 316(b)
1. Federal Mandate
Professor Roe would condition repeal on the institution of a protective
layer of federal law, proposing that the SEC by rule promulgate a broad
standard directed to any and all distortionary influences. As a theoretical
proposition, the suggestion has everything to recommend it, for the
suggestion it amounts to a mandate embodying the policy bottom line
described in Part I. But we worry about implementation. Marblegate shows
that single-minded pursuit of undistorted choice can have perverse effects.
Although existing law is far from perfect, its overall pattern is instructive—
rules, not standards, and reticence respecting the advisability of pushing
toward the theoretical ideal in arm’s length contexts. Conflicts are hard to
smoke out, and it would take an invasive disclosure regime to get them on the
table. And then there is the flood of suits. An SEC rule would presumably
fall within the existing private right of action under the TIA.252 As such, it
would not be subject to the lawsuit baffler that is universal in trust
indentures—a “no-action provision” requiring that a group holding at least
25% of the bonds coalesce to pursue a contract claim when the trustee declines
to do so.253
We also question whether it makes sense to leave the process regime’s
terms up to the SEC. The agency has been out of the bondholder protection
business for decades and has a lot of other things on its plate. Once the SEC
puts through a 66.67% CAC alternative, one doubts that it would monitor
investor preferences regarding further particulars on a going concern basis
even as experience accumulated in the marketplace.
Finally, and most importantly, the proposal follows from theory and
makes no reference to the preferences of bondholders. We will see below that
it is not safe to assume that they would agree to a ban on issuer coercion, or
indeed, that they would prefer a CAC regime in the first place.

252 The action dates back to Zeffiro v. First Pa. Banking & Tr. Co., 623 F.2d 290 (3d Cir. 1980),
which found that the Trust Indenture Act grants a cause of action to injured investors. Id. at 292.
253 See Brian Trust, New York State’s Highest Court Clarifies Scope of ‘No-Action’ Clause
Under Trust Indenture, MAYER BROWN (June 18, 2014), https://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/
detailprint.aspx?publication=10418 [https://perma.cc/V68F-V3X9] (describing operation and purpose
of no-action clauses).
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2. Contracting Practice
Trust indentures are famously unresponsive to change. This is partly
because the TIA locks in a number of their provisions. Even outside of the
TIA’s purview, standardization (wherein lies a part of the value of these
contracts) inhibits innovation. For policy purposes, trust indentures tend to
be written off as expressions of bondholder preferences.
We think that is a mistake, at least with regard to the practice of respecting
indenture terms governing amendments and waivers. To support our point,
we collected a sample of indentures governing new issues of bonds issued
during the second quarter of 2011, well before the Marblegate decision, and
the second quarter of 2016, after understanding of Marblegate and its
implications had a chance to diffuse through the bond market. Our sample is
restricted to offerings pursuant to the 144A registration exemption because
144A indentures do not need to be qualified under the TIA. Some issuers
scrupulously conform to the TIA nonetheless—it is common in the 144A
market to give purchasers a concomitant option to exchange their 144A
indentures for registered bonds offering bondholders ex post TIA
qualification for their indentures. Other issues are “144A for life” and, once
their transfer restrictions lift after six months, trade in a QIB market. The
territory thus is open to heterogeneous responses to developments under the
TIA—nothing prevents a drafter of a “144A for life” issue from including an
across-the-board CAC. Our sample is culled from EDGAR’s Form 8-K files,
pursuant to a request requiring “144A,” “indenture,” and “notes” and the
relevant item and exhibit designations.254 The 2011 sample includes 49
indentures and the 2016 sample includes 59.
Figure 2 describes basic terms of the transactions in the data set. In 2011,
two-thirds of the deals included registration rights, a percentage that declined
to 36% in 2016, reflecting the diminishing relevance of trading restrictions in
the 144A market. Most of the bonds were guarantied by other entities in the
issuer’s corporate group. Most of the bonds also were straight senior debt, but
there were large subsets of secured and convertible bonds along with a smaller
subset of subordinated issues.

254

The search was run through the Wharton Research Data Services SEC Analytics Suite.
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Figure 2: Core Terms of Rule 144A Indentures
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a. Drafting Out from Under Marblegate
Bond counsel reacted negatively to Marblegate and responded in “144A for
life” issues by contracting out from under section 316(b), changing a drafting
pattern dating back at least to the TIA.
Figure 3 depicts the appearance of amendment provisions. In 2011, 100%
of the issues contained a classic trust indenture UAC operating as a proviso
to a CAC. The CAC permits amendment of any terms by a simple majority
but is qualified by a limitation prohibiting changes to core terms without the
consent of each bondholder affected thereby.255 In 2016, the classic UAC
proportion declined to 93.2%. Four of the indentures in the 2016 group drop
the unanimous consent requirement for core terms and substitute
supermajority provisions (90% in three, 75% in one). The shift suggests
resistance to Marblegate in “144A for life” issues, with the choice of a 90%
CAC in three out of four further suggesting that the relaxation of the
unanimity requirement specifically targets holdouts.

255 A simple majority is employed across the board. A half century ago the rule of thumb was
two-thirds. See AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 56, at 305-06 (including a two-thirds
CAC and commenting that the two-thirds threshold is “required generally”).
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Figure 3: Core Terms of Rule 144A Indentures
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The implication of resistance becomes stronger when we look at section
316(b) clauses. Trust indentures customarily include a term that repeats the
language of section 316(b) in addition to including an explicit UAC. In 2011,
100% of the indentures contained a provision that replicated section 316(b)
without substantive variation. In 2016, that number had dropped to 81%.
The section 316(b) clause has become the platform for getting out from
under the broad reading, and is utilized as such in 17% of the 2016 indentures. It
is a less drastic approach than that taken in the four CAC indentures. The drafter
rephrases the section 316 clause to narrow the scope of the “right.” Thus do we
see a prohibition of impairment of “the contractual right to bring suit.”256 This
indicates an intent to block broader readings emanating not from the contract
but from the TIA. The “contractual” right is further defined as a right “to bring
suit” and a right against application of unconsented amendment, more
concretely blocking interpolation of a transcendent right to be paid. Another
drafter simply states an affirmative “right to bring suit” for principal and
interest,257 eliminating the separate right “to receive payment” entirely.
256 Realogy Group LLC, Indenture (Exhibit to Form 8-K) § 6.07 (June 3, 2016), available at
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1355001/000119312516612588/d198553dex41.htm
[https://perma.cc/5AHY-Q4PK].
257 PVH Corp., Indenture (Exhibit to Form 8-K) § 6.07 (June 20, 2016), available at
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/78239/000007823916000084/indenturewithusbank62016.htm
[https://perma.cc/F6CD-7SUW].
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Eight of the indentures proceed this way. Another three leave the section
316(b) clause out entirely. An additional four contain a clause that blocks
application of the TIA even as they also contain a classic section 316(b)
clause.258 The apparent objective is to block the broad reading of the clause
by blocking application of the statute. By one means or another, 23.7% of the
indentures block the broad reading.
There is also a more drastic decline in inclusion of a standard backstop clause
specifying that the TIA controls the indenture whatever else the indenture
says—down from 88% of the 2011 indentures to 42% of the 2016 indentures.
b. Unanimous Action Expanded & Exit Consents Permitted
The belt-and-suspenders drafting approach—explicit UAC plus 316(b)
clause—has important implications for section 316(b) repeal. If repeal
occurred tomorrow, the 316(b) clauses would still be in the indentures. Even
if repeal had the effect of removing 316(b) clauses from existing bonds, the
separate UACs would remain, thereby limiting the legislative shift to majority
consent to future indentures.
Three additional drafting patterns should be noted, these appearing in
common in both 2011 and 2016. The drafters effectively endorse the current
framework of restructuring in three ways: they extend the UAC’s coverage
beyond the mandate of 316(b), leave the section 316(a) mandate as is, and
sanction exit consents.
The UAC extensions go beyond the traditional core payment terms to pick
up redemption terms, guaranties, conversion provisions, and subordination
language.259 Amendment terms on liens split the difference, permitting
security to be released on a two-thirds or three-quarters vote. Further
extensions appear frequently but not consistently—48.6% of the indentures
extend the UAC to “priority” and 21.1% pick up their poison put provision. In
effect, the drafters of these indentures are broadening the set of “core” terms.260
Movement toward bondholder protection is not thorough-going,
however. The drafters might also have extended the reach of TIA section
316(a), which disqualifies votes of bonds held by the issuer and its affiliates.261
The indentures in our sample track 316(a) closely, where they might have
Still four more employ this clause in addition to employing the other techniques.
The correspondences are not quite perfect, more likely indicating sloppy use of forms than
intentional omission. For example, out of twenty-two convertible issues, one omits to put the
provisions under the UAC. The numbers respecting guaranties are less thorough—88.2% in 2011,
77% in 2016—and conceivably could support an inference of issuer pushback.
260 The parameters have widened since the drafters of the Model Indenture reported in 1971. Their
amendment clause includes payment terms only, with the note mentioning practice extension only to
redemption, conversion, and liens. See AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 56, at 305-09.
261 See supra text accompanying notes 54–55.
258
259
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defined additional classes of prohibited self-interest. For example, consent
payments also could be barred in specified situations, and empty voting could
be addressed. This is probably a considered result, for a more expansive
reading of section 316(a) directed to exit consents has been mooted in the law
journals262 and also litigated without much success.263
Most indentures also sanction exit consents, confounding the expectations
of academics. Professors Coffee and Klein, writing in the wake of Katz v. Oak
Industries, suggested that all it would take is a little nudge and indenture
drafters would wake up and shut down exit consents by requiring that
amendments and exchange offer tenders be unbundled.264 But the opposite
occurred. Express sanction of amendments by exiting bondholders is
widespread without being ubiquitous—67.3% of the 2011 indentures and
79.6% of the 2016 indentures include them.
262 Professors Coffee and Klein suggested that bonds submitted with exit consents could be
deemed “owned” or “controlled” by the bond issuer, running afoul of both the trust indenture’s
voting provisions and TIA section 316(a). See Coffee & Klein, supra note 34, at 1257 (explaining that
“at the time the amendment is voted upon, the obligor does not ‘own’ the bonds; they are still owned
by the person who has tendered them”). The idea was to read “owned” in 316(a) broadly to include
control, and it suggested an economic reality test looking to beneficial interest, not just legal
ownership, thereby sweeping exit consents into the prohibition. See id. at 1258 (noting that “[o]ne
could, of course, torture the interpretation of ‘ownership’ to produce a rule allowing the use of exit
consents for benign, but not for pernicious, purposes”).
263 The theory that the issuer owns bonds tendered with exit consents proved persuasive in a
UK case, Assénagon Asset Mgmt. S.A. v. Irish Bank Resolution Corp., [2012] EWHC 2090 (Ch) (Eng).
The indenture provision in question provided that “[n]either the Issuer nor any Subsidiary shall be
entitled to vote at any meeting in respect of Notes beneficially held by it for its account.” Id. at ¶ 16.
Taking a formalist approach, the High Court of Justice ruled that by the time the votes garnered
under the exit consents were cast at a later bondholders’ meeting, the bonds were beneficially held by
the issuer because the contract of sale contained a specific performance provision and a refusal to
deliver the bond would not be adequately compensated by monetary damages. Id. at ¶¶ 62-67.
The Caesars I plaintiffs tried this out, arguing that the issuer either owned or controlled the
bonds redeemed from the favored bondholders and thus could not vote those bonds. Meehancombs
Glob. Credit Opportunity Funds, LP v. Caesars Entm’t Corp., 80 F. Supp. 3d 507, 516-17 (S.D.N.Y.
2015). The court rejected the theory, taking the same formalist tack as did the earlier Assénagon court.
See id. at 517 (holding that Plaintiff ’s “control allegations . . . are insufficient” because their complaint
“does not allege that the Participating Noteholders were anything other than unaffiliated,
independent third parties that entered into an arm’s length transaction to provide their consents.”).
But this time the background was different, for the consents were delivered before the issuer took
ownership of the bonds. See id. (noting that “the August 2014 Transaction was structured so that the
Favored Noteholders’ consents were given before the notes were sold to Caesars, [so] MeehanCombs
does not allege ownership.”). Hence, there were no “owned” votes; nor were the votes under issuer
“control,” for the voters were “unaffiliated, independent third parties” acting at arm’s length. Id.
264 See Coffee & Klein, supra note 34, at 1257 (asserting that “[i]t would be possible, of course,
to devise language that would clearly foreclose or limit the exit consent procedure”). Coffee and
Klein also suggested that the contractual duty of good faith, long somnolent in the area of
relationships between issuers and bondholders and within groups of bondholders, could come to
bear effectively if only courts would wake up and bring it to bear. See id. at 1258 (recommending that
courts “generate a rule consistent with good results by invoking one of the two judicial constructs described
below: the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing or the requirement of good faith voting”).
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The bond issuers’ interest in assuring the validity of exit consents is clear
enough. Significantly, it concerns more than the reservation of freedom of action
in distress situations. The primary value of an exit consent lies on the upside,
when the issuer of a noncallable bond seeks to pay it down early. The means to
that end is a premium cash repurchase tender offer. An exit consent tie in gives
the offer a kick. The result is additional flexibility for the issuer, which gets to
shave a few basis points off the interest rate on the bond in exchange for it being
noncallable, while simultaneously keeping open a paydown option.265
Bondholder acquiescence presents a bit of a puzzle, for bondholders are
supposed to be the victims here. Why would they sanction their own
coercion? Indeed, the preferences suggested appear contradictory—in
favor of both unanimous action (retarding workouts) and coercive
exchange offers (encouraging workouts).
Here is our attempt to make the pattern intelligible. The bondholders do
not trust one another to vote sincerely on amendments of core terms and are
jealous of their holdout privilege, hence the UAC expansion. At the same
time, they understand that holding out can lead to problems and want to give
issuers a reasonable shot at an out-of-court restructuring. Restating, “Make
me an offer and I’ll look at it, but don’t try to tell me what to do.” In addition,
bondholders are happy to pick up a little added yield when an issuer makes a
premium cash tender offer and have no trouble handing an issuer a stick to
help such a deal along.
If that is a fair characterization, follow-up questions arise: can we go a
step farther and conclude that bondholders prefer unanimous action; that
they are unconcerned about coercive issuer tactics; and that, left to their own
devices, they would leave workout practice as is? We can suggest these
possibilities but cannot go farther. We do not know how large of a role path
dependency plays in bond indenture drafting.
It also can be projected that, given a blank slate, bondholders would herd
to CACs. The UAC versus CAC question has been exhaustively discussed in
the sovereign bond market since the spectacular Argentine default of 2001.266
Historically, sovereign debt issues effected in New York were covered by
UACs (despite the inapplicability of the TIA to sovereign bond issues), while
issues effected in London were governed by CACs.267 Argentina had a

265 See BRATTON, supra note 19, at 351-53 (explaining that issuers pay for redemption rights
with higher interest rate).
266 See Bratton & Gulati, supra note 23, at 4 (noting that after Argentina’s experience, “the
Treasury projects that sovereign bondholders will willingly exchange their UAC bonds for CAC
bonds, ameliorating the coordination problems”).
267 See id. at 7, 12 (noting “the persistent use for more than a century of UACs in New Yorkbased sovereign debt issues and CACs in London-based debt issues”).
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significant amount of debt outstanding under UACs.268 Default led to a
fractious workout by exchange offer. Related litigation finally settled in
2016.269 The public side of the international financial community (which has
never been able to come up with a sovereign bankruptcy regime) blamed the
mess on the UACs. CACs became part of a policy push for orderly
restructuring.270 Sovereign borrowers were pressured to insist on CACs,271
and a widespread shift of preferences followed.272 Two points emerge: first,
bondholder preferences regarding CACs and UACs are mutable, and, second,
boilerplate amendment terms can indeed change in response to events.
It should be noted that our data also suggest a counterprojection. Caesars
and Marblegate did not precipitate a widespread shift to CACs, implying that
there is no pent-up demand for collective action. If there were, it is not
implausible to suggest that a cascade would have occurred in the 144A market
in Marblegate’s wake.

268 See id. at 20-21 (noting that “[o]f Argentina’s $111.8 billion of foreign bonds, 89 percent were
issued pursuant to debt contracts containing unanimous action clauses”).
269 Argentina effected a take-it-or-leave-it exchange offer implicating a substantial haircut, but
left outstanding a sizable population of holdout bonds. A several-year standoff followed as the
holdouts, led by hedge funds, pursued their U.S. law remedies where they could, finally vindicating
their right to payment in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 2012. See NML
Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 250 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that “an equal
treatment provision in the bonds bars Argentina from discriminating against plaintiffs’ bonds in
favor of bonds issued in connection with the restructurings and that Argentina violated that
provision by ranking its payment obligations on the defaulted debt below its obligations to the
holders of its restructured debt”). Only in 2016 (when execution of the federal court judgment
threatened to disrupt Argentina’s payments to its cooperative creditors) did Argentina come to the
table and settle, giving the holdouts the last laugh. But by then, the contracting practice had changed
substantially, with supermajority CACs becoming the sovereign debt standard. See, e.g., Alexandra
Stevenson, How Argentina Settled a Billion Dollar Dispute with Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25,
2016) http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/25/business/dealbook/how-argentina-settled-a-billion-dollar-debtdispute-with-hedge-funds.html (summarizing highlights of the negotiation between Argentina and
its debtholders); see also Josh Macfarlane, Recent Development, Could Collective Action Clauses Have Saved
Argentina’s Presidential Plane?, HARV. INT’L L.J., Apr. 1, 2016, http://www.harvardilj.org/2016/04/couldcollective-action-clauses-have-saved-argentinas-presidential-plane/ (noting that Argentina might have
avoided its problems “had Argentina’s sovereign bonds included a novel contract provision known
as a Collective Action Clause”).
270 See Bratton & Gulati, supra note 23, at 46 (noting that “majority action enforcement clauses,”
alongside CACs, “make[] restructuring easier by relaxing the unanimity requirement and makes it
harder for maverick creditors, in search of preferential payments, to bring disruptive litigation”).
271 The borrowers had assumed that, given issuance in New York, bondholders’ marked
preference for UACs entailed a beneficial give back in the form of a lower interest rate.
272 Ben Emons, Collective Action Clauses: No Panacea for Sovereign Debt Restructurings, PIMCO,
Oct. 2010, at 1, 1 (describing CAC diffusion after the Argentinian default).
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3. Conclusion
We see, then, that present arrangements could reflect considered
preferences and would be replicated unchanged in future contracts. It is also
possible that preferences would adjust if Congress opened the door for CACs,
and that the shock might break the drafting pattern in other respects as well.
There is no certain prediction. What we can say is that bond contracting is
sensitive to workout process questions and does register the preferences of
issuers and bondholders, and that as between bond contract drafters and SEC
staffers, the former are better equipped to accomplish the task.
C. CACs—the Worst Case
1. The Drafting Task in the Wake of Repeal
Outright repeal of section 316(b) would clean the slate, raising a series of
questions for indenture drafters. First comes the CAC versus UAC choice. A
choice for CAC raises a subsidiary question about acceptance percentages,
not only the number set for payment terms, but whether to incorporate
percentage differentials for different categories of contract term. There would
also be a critical additional question: whether to bar exit consents; indeed,
whether to bar exchange offers altogether. Arguably, with a 66.67% or 75%
CAC, exchange offers no longer would serve a legitimate purpose in workout
contexts. A prohibition would close off a whole avenue of coercive
possibilities. Finally, conflicted bondholder voting and vote-buying (whether
an offer to all holders or selected holders) could and should be reconsidered.273
The adjustment process could be slow and messy. The Marblegate drafting
adjustment presents a case in point. If we assume, as seems sensible, that
preferences lie against the broad reading, the fact that 37.5% of the 144A for
life indentures in the sample opted out one year to eighteen months after the
decision does not bespeak highly focused drafting. Why not all of them?
Perhaps preferences differ from issue to issue. More likely, there is both
inattention and considered avoidance of change (also known as path
dependence). Alternatively, let us assume that bondholders generally are
happy to sanction exit consents, an assumption that seems reasonable in view
of the fact that 68% and 80% of the indentures in the samples did just that.
The same question arises.
The lack of focus follows from the deals’ underwritten character. The
bondholders are represented at the drafting table only by a proxy—counsel
for the underwriter—whose client is interested in bondholder protection only
273 We received a report from a practitioner that language barring selective offers of consideration
has appeared in recent indentures. We did not run across such a clause in our own sample, however.
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to the extent that it imports marketability. There is no marching order to
assure that the lender’s perspective informs all fine points, as would be the
case in a negotiated bank loan. Risk allocation conventions evolve, but with
incomplete coverage. Imperfections creep in.
2. The Worst Case
Let us imagine that section 316(b) is repealed, and indenture drafters
respond by inserting 75% CACs, but do not follow up by blocking exchange
offers and exit consents. Instead, they follow the practice that evolved with
European sovereign bond issues and raise the threshold percentage for
covenant amendments from 51% to 75%. The operative notion is that the
increase in the threshold makes exit consents less user-friendly for the issuer,
making direct amendment more attractive than an exchange offer.
This sets the stage for the worst case scenario, illustrated by a decision
that arose under the law of England and Wales. Assénagon Asset Mgmt. S.A. v.
Irish Bank Resolution Corp.274 involved an exchange offer featuring new bonds
with a face value of €20 and an exit consent that amended the principal
amount of the old bonds from €100 to €0.01.275 The issuer was an insolvent
bank subjected to a government takeover, and the offer derived from a
government policy decision. There was disputed evidence that the bonds had
been trading for €20, but no evidence of negotiation. Presumably, none was
needed, given the high-octane coercive possibilities that result when a drafter
combines an across-the-board CAC without simultaneously barring exchange
offers and exit consents. 92% of the bondholders knuckled under.
There is a notable similarity to Marblegate, the choice between €20 and
€0.01 being no different from the choice between $33 and $0. But the cases
are otherwise sharply distinguishable. Marblegate was a negotiated deal
amongst creditors who had nowhere else to go and acute vulnerability to
holdouts due to a UAC. Assénagon was a take-it-or-leave-it offer embodying
the issuer’s notion of an appropriate price where a CAC otherwise would have
facilitated amendment without coercion.
The moral of the story is that a CAC regime, even as it nominally serves
the purpose of reducing distortion, opens up wildly coercive possibilities

[2012] EWHC (Ch) 2090.
Id. at ¶ 32. The amendment inserted a right to redeem for €0.01. Procedurally, Assénagon was
on a Part 8 claim, the England and Wales equivalent to a motion for summary judgment in which
there is no material dispute as to facts. See Summary Judgment: A Quick Guide, THOMSON REUTERS
PRACTICAL LAW, https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/6-204-3085 (noting that “[s]ummary
judgment is available in Part 8 proceedings although the nature of such proceedings may mean that
it is not necessary”) (last visited Mar. 14, 2018).
274
275
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unless the drafting is thorough-going. Current drafting practice promises
responsiveness but not completeness, inserting an element of risk.
D. Backstop Policing: An Intercreditor Duty of Good Faith
Given repeal of section 316(b) and substitution of CACs, exit consents
would lose their expedient attractiveness and emerge as an instrument of pure
coercion. Absent a contractual prohibition, the judiciary would be called on
to intervene. In this section we show how that can be done, looking to the
intercreditor duty of good faith.
The intercreditor duty responds to a good faith claim asserted by one
bondholder in response to an action taken by other bondholders. The posture
is different from the limited good faith duty described in Part II, which
involves claims asserted in suits by bondholders against issuers. The duty is
articulated in a largely forgotten line of cases antedating the TIA, cases
showing strong grounds for a robust implied duty in workout contexts. Not
coincidentally, this duty led to an outcome in the plaintiff ’s favor in Assénagon.
It also would have provided an alternative basis for blocking the Caesars I
amendment, an approach which would not also have implied invalidation for
the Marblegate restructuring.
An intercreditor duty would do more than just provide a basis for the
right result in an extreme case. It would also improve the drafting
environment. Most observers assume that the burden to draft an explicit
contract provision should fall on the party asserting the right, on the sensible
ground that this is the party with the correct incentive and possibly superior
information. Trust indentures are different, however, because the deals are
underwritten, meaning that the bondholders themselves are not represented
in the drafting. Instead, to the extent their interests are represented, it is by
the underwriters’ counsel, but the underwriters’ interests are limited to the
initial marketability of the bonds and do not perfectly align with those of the
bondholders, particularly if the bonds were originally investment grade, such
that a restructuring was not anticipated. Incentives on the bondholder side
are diffuse, and influence is indirect. To get a contract-forcing result, it makes
much more sense to put the burden on the issuer, at least so far as concerns
process terms in the wake of section 316(b)’s repeal.
1. Intercreditor Good Faith Cases
A bondholder duty constraining self-interested unilateral or majority
action not in the best interests of the bondholders as a group can be seen in a
pair of nineteenth-century Supreme Court cases. In the 1874 case of Jackson
v. Ludeling, the Court was faced with the problem of an individual bondholder
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who foreclosed on the collateral securing the bond and artificially depressed
the price in the foreclosure sale so that his associate could purchase a $2
million railroad for $50,000.276 The Court noted that the foreclosing
bondholder was “not a partner with [the other bondholders], nor strictly a
tenant in common, but the relation into which he introduced himself by his
purchase [of the bonds] imposed on him some duties.”277 According to the
Court, it “was a duty which he owed to the other bondholders not to destroy
[the mortgage’s] value. When two or more persons have a common interest
in a security, equity will not allow one . . . to impair its worth to the others.
Community of interest involves mutual obligation.”278 The Court commented
similarly in Shaw v. Railroad Co.:
If there are differences of opinion among the bondholders as to what their
interests require, it is not improper that [the indenture trustee] should be
governed by the voice of the majority, acting in good faith and without
collusion, if what they ask is not inconsistent with the provisions of his trust.279

An analogous approach can be found in an 1896 Second Circuit Court of
Appeals case, Hackettstown Nat’l Bank v. D.G. Yuengling Brewing Co.280 In
Hackettstown, the bond issuer—the famous brewery—had defaulted on its
interest payments.281 The company’s principal shareholder arranged for a
friendly party to buy enough of the bonds to amass (together with bonds held
by other Yuengling family members) the three-quarters majority necessary to
amend the bonds’ indenture to defer the interest payments.282 The principal
shareholder personally agreed to repay the friendly party’s investment with
interest.283 A minority bondholder sued over the indenture amendment. The
Second Circuit nullified the amendment, noting that a vote “made collusively
. . . for the purpose of defeating the remedy of the minority, and not in the
exercise of an honest discretion in the general interest, is not a consent within
the meaning of the indenture.”284 The court’s ruling was based on a
“community of interest” that “creates mutual obligation, and imposes upon

276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284

88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 616, 621 (1874).
Id. at 622.
Id.
Shaw v. R.R. Co., 100 U.S. 605, 612 (1880).
74 F. 110 (2d Cir. 1896).
Id. at 110.
Id. at 111.
Id.
Id. at 112.
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all persons occupying that position the duty of acting in good faith toward
the interests of their associates.”285
In the nineteenth century, then, majority rule was always subject to
a requirement of good faith and a prohibition on collusion with the
debtor. It is important to note that the courts did not think of this as an
imposition of fiduciary duty, even as they analogized to partners. It was
a situation-specific duty, springing not from the overall relationship, but
from the vested power to vote or enforce. While a fiduciary-like duty of
self-abnegation did result, it was situational and without further
implications for the relationship. 286
The good faith constraint on majority bondholder voting power retains
vitality in English case law, perhaps because there is no statutory equivalent
to the TIA and bonds are governed by across-the-board CACs.287 Assénagon is
an exemplar of its application. A nonexchanging minority bondholder, whose
€17 million were forcibly redeemed for a mere €170, brought suit challenging
the validity of the majority’s exit consents.288

285 Id. While duty qualified the principle of majority rule, it did not prevent majorities from
binding minorities. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Cleveland v. Shedd, 121 U.S. 74, 86-87 (1887)
(applying Shaw v. R.R. Co.); Shaw v. R.R. Co., 100 U.S. 605, 612 (1880) (noting that “it is not
improper that [minorities] should be governed by the voice of the majority”); In re Schommer, 112
F.2d 311, 314-315 (7th Cir. 1940) (following the approach laid out in Shaw v. R.R. Co.); see also
Crosthwaith v. Moline Plow Co., 298 F. 466, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (denying minority bondholder’s
suit in contravention of collective action clause to challenge equity reorganization). The duty went
together with a requirement that the benefits of the majority’s decision be shared by all the holders of
the same security. See id. (noting that “it would be most inequitable to allow a small minority of
bondholders, or a comparatively insignificant number of creditors, in the absence of even any pretense
of fraud or unfairness, to defeat the wishes of the overwhelming majority of those associated with them
in the benefits of their common security”).
286 See Charles H. Haines, Jr., Comment, Modification of Corporate Mortgages and Trust Indentures, 38
MICH. L. REV. 63, 67 (1939) (“But granted an exercise within the explicit power of the majority, still the
courts will inquire into the manner and circumstances of its exercise before holding the minority bound
by their irrevocable assent to the alterations. The approach of the courts is that the majority are in a
fiduciary relationship to the minority, with a power in trust to be used only for the common good of all.”).
287 The English principle derives from partnership and majority-minority shareholder cases.
See Blisset v. Daniel [1853] EWHC (Ch) 10 Hare 493, 523-24 (describing duty in partnership); In re
Westbourne Galleries [1973] AC 360 (HL) 381 (evaluating conduct of shareholders in limited
company); O’Neill v. Phillips [1999] 1 WLR 1092 (HL) 1098-1101 (discussing duties owed by
shareholders in limited company); Allen v. Gold Reefs of West Africa [1900] EWHC (Ch) 656, 671
(same). It imposes a good faith limitation on the power of a creditor majority to bind a minority.
See, e.g., Brit. Am. Nickel Corp. v. M. J. O’Brien [1927] AC 369 (PC) 371 (noting that majority
shareholder action is subject to the general principle that “power given must be exercised for the
purpose of benefiting the class as a whole, and not merely individual members”); Redwood
Masterfund Ltd. v. TD Bank Europe Ltd. [2006] 1 BCLC 149 (holding that majoritarian amendment
of the terms of a syndicated loan facility was not in bad faith). Any votes not cast in good faith are
to be disregarded. In re Empire Mining Co., [1890] EWHC 44 (Ch) 403; In re Wedgwood Coal &
Iron Co., [1877] EWHC 6 (Ch) 627.
288 Assénagon Asset Mgmt. S.A. v. Irish Bank Resolution Corp., [2012] EWHC (Ch) 2090, ¶ 37.
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The High Court of Justice applied the intercreditor duty:
The exit consent is, quite simply a coercive threat . . . [the] only function [of
which] is the intimidation of a potential minority . . . . This form of coercion is
. . . entirely at variance with the purposes for which majorities in a class are
given power to bind minorities . . . . [O]ppression of a minority is of the essence
of exit consents of this kind, and it is precisely that at which the principles
restraining the abusive exercise of powers to bind minorities are aimed.289

Assénagon is cut from the same cloth as the nineteenth-century American
intercreditor cases, but carries them a step into new territory. In those old
cases, the voting infirmity arose in respect of bondholder conflicts of interest,
independent of issuer action. In Assénagon, the conflict stemmed from
bondholder responses to issuer coercion. Indeed, it delivered the good faith
constraint at the issuer’s doorstep by indirection, nominally in conflict with
the result in Katz v. Oak Industries. The High Court acknowledged the point,
noting that the exit consent is an invitation from the issuer for the “majority
to levy against the minority.”290 But the duty under consideration was that of
a bondholder, not an issuer, so “it is no answer for [the majority] to say that
it is the issuer which has required or invited them to do so.”291
2. The Disappearance of Intercreditor Good Faith Cases
in the United States
The idea that express contract rights given to majority bondholders must
be equitably exercised was black letter law on the eve of the enactment of the
TIA.292 An evolutionary dead end followed. Why did the line of cases die
Id. ¶¶ 40-47.
Id. ¶ 85.
Id. As noted in Part II, the intercreditor good faith tradition also lives on within
bankruptcy, which provides that any votes not cast in good faith in Chapter 11 may be “designated”
and cast in the judge’s discretion. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(e) (1988). Although this is not a blanket bar
against self-interested voting, it covers much the same territory as did the intercreditor cases.
292 Hackettstown was featured in leading corporate finance texts in the 1930s and was favorably
cited in congressional debates on the Trust Indenture Act. See Coffee & Klein, supra note 34, at 1262
n.158 (“The case was featured in a leading treatise on bonds published in 1937 . . . [and] also figured
in prominent legal corporate finance texts of the 1930s”); Roe, supra note 104, at 252 n.54 (“The
Hackettstown case figured in prominent legal corporate finance texts of the 1930s.”). The Hackettstown
case received extended treatment in a treatise written the year after the opinion came out. See
EDWARD LYMANN SHORT, THE LAW OF RAILROAD BONDS AND MORTGAGES IN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA: WITH ILLUSTRATIVE CASES FROM ENGLISH AND COLONIAL COURTS
50-51 (1897); see also Sage v. Cent. R.R. Co., 99 U.S. 334, 341 (1879) (holding that an agreement was
reasonable even though it prevented a “small minority of bondholders from forcing unreasonable
289
290
291
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out? First and foremost, the TIA had the effect of shifting a substantial
portion of restructuring activity into bankruptcy, where it occurred under
judicial supervision and with express good faith duties. As a result,
intercreditor duties slipped out of the collective memory, so much so that
they were not cited in the cases of Marblegate and Caesars.
Second, intercreditor duties simultaneously lost their framework of
application. The duty was articulated in equity receiverships in which federal
courts applied federal equity jurisprudence, a body of law that looks much
like a federal common law, in umpiring corporate restructuring. While federal
equity receiverships are still possible, they have largely been supplanted by
bankruptcy proceedings. Moreover, the merger of law and equity in the 1938
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Supreme Court’s 1938 holding in Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins that “there is no general federal common law”293 rendered
further confusion about the role and continued viability of federal equity
jurisprudence. As a result, the old equity receivership cases endure as homeless
precedents; strictly speaking, binding no one.294 But that does not deprive them
of persuasive status—the late twentieth century good faith duty can be seen
picking up legal notions that formerly took shape on the courts’ equitable side.
Meanwhile, out-of-court restructuring is returning to real world salience. Looking
back to pre-Depression case law provides sensible doctrinal guidance.
Third, as the bond market shifted from mom-and-pop bondholders to
institutional investors, courts likely became less concerned about
intercreditor voting conflicts. Consider Aladdin Hotel Co. v. Bloom,295 which
generations of corporate finance textbooks have used to illustrate the evils
that can befall minority bondholders in the absence of the TIA.296
The story of Aladdin Hotel begins with the bankruptcy of the Armour
Building Company, which in 1925 built a sixteen-floor Italian Romanesque
building in downtown Kansas City, Missouri, called the Aladdin Hotel (now
and inequitable concessions from the majority”); In re Georgian Hotel Corp., 82 F.2d 917, 919 (7th
Cir. 1936) (rejecting the proposition that section 77B is unconstitutional and void in so far as it
empowers the bankruptcy court to require minority nonconsenting creditors of a particular class to
accept any major modification of their original contractual relation); Vogelstein v. Ath. Mining Co.,
192 S.W. 760, 763 (Mo. Ct. App. 1917) (enforcing a provision that gave the owners of two-thirds of
the bonds at issue the power to modify the terms of the deed trust).
293 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
294 We do not venture a theory here for the dormancy of intercreditor good faith cases in
England and Wales in the decades prior to Assénagon.
295 200 F.2d 627 (8th Cir. 1953).
296 See, e.g., BRATTON, supra note 19, 548-52 (introducing Aladdin Hotel with a discussion of
problems facing shareholders in workout situations); LEVITIN, supra note 21, at 157-61; MARK J. ROE
& FREDERICK TUNG, BANKRUPTCY AND CORPORATE REORGANIZATION: LEGAL AND
FINANCIAL MATERIALS 470-74 (4th ed. 2016). Curiously, despite its academic canonization, Aladdin
Hotel received no notice in the legal press when it was first decided. The case has only been cited a
few times since in other decisions, and the scholarly literature did not start citing to it until the 1980s.
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a Holiday Inn).297 The Armour Building Company found itself in bankruptcy
in the 1930s and was reorganized as the Aladdin Hotel Company, with its
prepetition bondholders receiving both Aladdin’s newly issued bonds and
equity.298 As in Hackettstown, Aladdin’s majority equityholders also held a
majority of the bond issue.299 When the new bonds came due, the Aladdin
Hotel Company sought to extend the bonds’ maturity date by ten years; this
amendment had the knock-on effect of decreasing the interest rate from the
postmaturity rate of 8% to the prematurity rate of 5%.300 The indenture had a
two-thirds majority CAC301 and the TIA did not apply because the bonds had
been issued in 1938.302 Critically, the members of the bondholder majority who
approved the amendment also owned a majority of the issuer’s common
stock.303 A minority bondholder challenger won in the district court, but lost
in the Eighth Circuit.
Although Aladdin was not precisely framed in intercreditor terms—the
Eighth Circuit posed it as an equitable inquiry—the case has intercreditor
characteristics. Because the indenture explicitly permitted majority
amendment, the plain language of the indenture gave the plaintiff no case at
law. The only attack the plaintiff had was an equitable claim about the
amendment’s unfairness. The Eighth Circuit, however, proved blind to the
operative incentives, proclaiming that “it is inconceivable that the
[equityholders] should deliberately act to the prejudice or detriment of the
bondholders when they held and owned some 72 per cent of the entire
outstanding bond issue.”304 Although this language is extreme, the case should
not be read as a wholesale repudiation of the earlier intercreditor cases. The
297 DEP’T OF INTERIOR, National Register of Historic Places Inventory: Nomination Form 2-3
(June 24, 1983), https://npgallery.nps.gov/pdfhost/docs/NRHP/Text/64000395.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C79E-8HSD].
298 Record at 16-17, Aladdin Hotel Co. v. Bloom, No. 14,645 (8th Cir. pre-trial stipulations July
16, 1952) (on file with authors).
299 See Aladdin Hotel, 200 F.2d at 628 (noting that equityholders also held 72% of the bonds).
300 See Record at 91, 95, 99, 103, 107, 111, 115, Aladdin Hotel Co. v. Bloom, No. 14,645 (8th Cir.
pre-trial stipulations July 16, 1952) (on file with authors) (“Aladdin Hotel Company . . . promises
to pay the registered holder hereof . . . the sum of FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($500.00), on
the 1st day of September, 1948 . . . and to pay interest thereon from date to maturity at the rate of
five per cent (5%) per annum, payable only out of net income of the Company . . . and to pay
interest at the rate of eight per cent (8%) per annum from maturity until paid.”).
301 See Aladdin Hotel, 200 F.2d at 628 (“[T]he bonds and deed of trust contained provision
empowering the bondholders of not less than two-thirds principal amount of the bonds, by agreement
with the Hotel Company to modify and extend the date of payment of said bonds provided such
extension affected all bonds alike.”).
302 See id. (recounting that the Aladdin Hotel Company “executed and delivered a series of
647 bonds” on September 1, 1938).
303 See id. at 628-29 (noting that the defendants owned a majority of the Hotel Company’s stock
while also being the owners and holders of more than two-thirds of the bonds’ principal amount).
304 Id. at 630.
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court noted that the alleged conflict of interest would not have mattered
anyway: the plaintiff had purchased the bonds after the amendment’s
completion, and equitable rights were not assignable under Missouri law.
Thus, the plaintiff ’s purchase included only the bond’s express legal rights.305
So, while Aladdin denied the plaintiff a good faith remedy, it kept open
the possibility of such relief for other plaintiffs at the time of the amendment.
Back in the 1950s, good faith was still understood as an equitable matter
requiring clean hands from the party seeking relief; in those days, distressed
debt investors apparently did not meet the requirement.306 Marblegate’s
contrastingly decorous treatment of the holdout plaintiff demonstrates how
attitudes toward distressed debt investing have changed.
Aladdin, then, does recognize an intercreditor good faith duty; it simply
reaches that duty through an equity framework. This is common for the older
precedents, while the modern approach focuses on a contract law framework
of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The older equitable
intercreditor good faith duty could be readily adapted, however, to the
modern implied covenant framework.
3. Scope
We now address the intercreditor duty’s scope of application in exchange
offer contexts. As a good faith duty, it would operate as a default while explicit
process rulemaking would be left to the drafters. The duty would easily
replicate the result in Caesars I, because it plainly constrains giving consent
in exchange for selective redemptions. The question is whether the duty does
a great deal more than that: as articulated in Assénagon, the duty could be read
to imply a categorical prohibition of exit consents. Given section 316(b), this
would throw a wrench into out-of-court restructuring, at least under

305 One wonders if there might have been more going on in Aladdin Hotel. The plaintiff, Mrs.
Bloom, was not some little old widow who had put her retirement savings into the Aladdin bonds.
Instead, her two brothers were corporate raiders who owned, among other things, Trans World Airlines
(at the time still headquartered in Kansas City). Mrs. Bloom apparently bought five of her seven bonds
from her brothers. See Appellant’s Brief at 3, 19, Aladdin Hotel Co. v. Josephine Loeb Bloom, No.
14,645 (8th Cir. filed Aug. 11, 1952) (on file with authors); Reply Brief for the Appellant at 9, Aladdin
Hotel Co. v. Josephine Loeb Bloom, No. 14,645 (on file with authors). The other bonds she had
purchased for ten cents on the dollar. Appellant’s Brief at 3, Aladdin Hotel Co. v. Josephine Loeb
Bloom, No. 14,645 (8th Cir. filed Aug. 11, 1952) (on file with authors). The point of the repeated
mention of these facts in Appellant’s brief is that Mrs. Bloom was serving as a front for her brothers
and was not bringing the suit in good faith.
306 The same approach can be seen in the case cited by Aladdin Hotel: Monticello Bldg. Corp. v.
Monticello Inv. Co., 330 Mo. 1128 (1932). Monticello held that a bondholder for a defaulted mortgage
was obligated “to show his own good faith and the equities of his own position” before getting a
court-appointed receiver for the mortgaged property. Id. at 1142.
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indentures not explicitly permitting exit consents.307 Contrariwise, categorical
prohibition of exit consents would make perfect sense in a CAC regime.
There is a further question regarding Marblegate: whether the duty, responding
to self-interested voting in Caesars I, also applies to the Marblegate bank lender’s
self-interested enforcement action. We think a solid line can be drawn.
Marblegate, in which an unsecured bondholder successfully challenged an
enforcement action undertaken by a secured bank lender, involved two issues
of debt. The court’s ruling imposed a duty on creditors under one instrument
to refrain from imposing what amounted to a restructuring on the creditors
under the other. The intercreditor good faith cases, in contrast, arise from
disputes among creditors under common instruments. We see no reason to
extend intercreditor good faith to creditors under multiple instruments
because creditors under different instruments are necessarily competitors
who have not impliedly bound themselves to share a recovery from what
might be a limited pool of assets.
Some gray areas complicate the line-drawing exercise. Consider conflicts
between different classes of creditors under the same instrument, such as the
senior-subordinate structure created in securitizations and multi-facility
syndicated loans. We think these should fall within the zone of good faith
because such creditors have bound themselves to share a recovery from a
potentially limited pool. Although they have structured the sharing as
something other than pro rata, the particular allocation is irrelevant; these
creditors should still have a duty to each other to maximize the overall
recovery. The same outcome should hold for creditors under separate
instruments who have bound themselves together through an intercreditor
agreement because they have voluntarily moved from the zone of self-interest
into the zone of mutual obligation.
Now consider situations involving creditors under separate instruments
who are connected not through an intercreditor agreement, but through
either (1) a senior-subordinate structure in which bondholders under one
instrument acquire senior status by taking an assignment of the junior claim,
or (2) a tag-along right, such as a tag-along guaranty or negative pledge clause.
We do not think that intercreditor good faith duties should apply. Creditors
on a junior note necessarily have a voluntary potential conflict with those on
a senior note. Likewise, tag-along rights can appear solely in one instrument; the
parties to the other instrument might not even be aware of the tag-along rights.

307 The solution to the problem, in the present context, would be to bring forward the nineteenthcentury cases but leave Assénagon behind. This would define a bad-faith action as a self-interested action
not in the best interests of the bondholders as a group, but not as an action undertaken for selfpreservation and not otherwise for private gain in response to an issuer’s coercive offer.
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Other doctrines, such as tortious interference with contract, might be better suited
to policing any manipulative behavior rather than a general duty of good faith.
4. Conclusion
Looking forward to a repeal of section 316(b), we believe that the
intercreditor good faith duty, taken together with the good faith duty’s
limited constraints against bond issuers, presents a viable framework for
policing coercion and opportunism in restructuring. It also would focus the
drafters’ attention. And, as a default, the rule would work better in the long
run than an open-ended federal antidistortion mandate.
V. CONCLUSION
The practice picture respecting workouts has changed dramatically, but
not so much as to solve a number of longstanding problems. There is no
perfect regulatory solution, leaving us in a zone of imperfections and
tradeoffs. But we draw five particular conclusions.
First, the expansive reading of section 316(b)—although laudably motivated—
was overly broad and followed from an incomplete review of the legislative history.
The Second Circuit was amply justified in reversing Marblegate. Despite this,
stepped up judicial policing under the good faith rubric on an intercreditor basis
would be useful and could respect contractual risk allocations.
Second, increased workout activity, taken together with changes in
bankruptcy practice, denude the case for repeal of section 316(b) of policy
urgency. Markets have shown that they can muddle through with the status quo.
Third, section 316(b) can be repealed prospectively without undue risk to
the bondholder interest. Take-it-or-leave-it exchange offers no longer present
a serious problem, for issuers now negotiate solely with bondholders who
know how to evaluate deals and say no. Even the section’s bankruptcy-forcing
purpose now rings hollow given the reality of secured creditor control, which
comes at the expense of unsecured bondholders.
Fourth, any repeal should be outright, leaving the matter to the drafters
and the market. The theory signals a CAC regime with ancillary process
protections, but it is not clear that investors prefer a theoretically correct
regime. Moreover, their preferences will be dynamic in time, evolving in
response to events. Also, a theoretically correct regime would be difficult to
implement due to the verification problem respecting bondholder conflicts.
Tradeoffs would have to be made, a matter best left to the contracting parties.
Finally, a backstop default regime incorporating an intercreditor good
faith duty would assist the transition process in the wake of repeal. Such a
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regime could focus the issuers’ attention and spur indenture forms in the
direction of a complete set of process rules.
The restructuring business has changed in recent decades, such that its New
Deal-derived legal paradigms no longer fit market realities. It is time to consider
a reform of restructuring law that facilitates fair and efficient workouts.

